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IN LUCE TUA 
Comment on Contemporary Affairs by the Editor 
Reflections on the Bork Nomination 
The dispute over the nomination of Robert Bork 
to the Supreme Court gives promise of being one of 
those special issues that reveal with particular clarity 
the fault lines of American politics. The struggle over 
Bork's confirmation has already aroused ideological 
passions and intensities unusual in our politics, and 
there's lots more to come. The substantive and politi-
cal consequences at stake are themselves of the great-
est importance, and beyond them lies the realm of 
symbolic politics in which the issue has been caught up 
and which raises it to a whole new level of significance. 
The controversy rages on two different planes of 
contention . The first involves straight political and so-
cial outcomes. Since the present Court is closely bal-
anced on a number of controverted issues, it is feared 
(or hoped) that Bork will tip the scales to the conser-
vative side on such policy matters as abortion, affirma-
tive action, church-and-state issues, free speech, or 
police search powers. From this perspective, the Bork 
dispute boils down to an ideological confrontation, a 
straight-out power struggle between Left and Right 
that ought to be understood as such and resolved on 
those grounds. 
But the second plane of contention, though not un-
related to the policy dispute, extends and complicates 
the argument and, at least for Bork's defenders, con-
stitutes the proper grounds on which the issue should 
be settled. In this view, judicial philosophy becomes 
the central issue and Bork's doctrine of judicial re-
straint his primary virtue. 
The doctrine of judicial restraint suggests that 
judges should take a stringently self-denying view of 
their task of judicial review. Theirs is not a policy-
making function. Since, once appointed, they are re-
moved from democratic accountability, they must 
never presume to substitute their standards concern-
ing the wisdom and virtue of public policy issues for 
those of duly elected and responsible officers of gov-
ernment in the legislative and executive branches. 
When engaged in review of the constitutionality of 
acts of Congress or the Executive, they should give the 
benefit of doubt of legitimacy to such actions. Laws of 
Congress or activities of the President may properly be 
invalidated only when they violate the clear meaning 
and intent of the relevant constitutional provisions. 
Judges should put restrictions on the people's demo-
cratically-expressed will only when the Constitution re-
quires them to do so. 
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Thus, for example, a judge bound by judicial re-
straint who personally opposed the death penalty or 
restrictions on abortion would nonetheless let pass 
legislative initiatives in those areas because such initia-
tives, whatever their intellectual or moral worth, run 
contrary to no clear constitutional stipulations. Those 
who would expand the boundaries of reform should 
have primary recourse to the political process, not the 
courts. Judges have no role as Platonic guardians of the 
true, the beautiful, and the good; put differently, the 
people have the right to be wrong, except where their 
unwisdom coincides with constitutional restrictions. 
Critics of judicial restraint, observing its effects on 
currently-disputed matters, sometimes argue that it is 
little more than an elaborate conservative contrivance 
for arriving at tory outcomes. But a moment's histori-
cal reflection suggests that such is not necessarily the 
case. In the late nineteenth century and again during 
the 1930s liberals urged just such restraint on judges 
who engaged in expansive and tortured readings of 
the Constitution in order to inhibit state and federal 
attempts to regulate business activities. Judicial re-
straint (or judicial activism) has no inherent ideological 
bias one way or another; everything depends on the is-
sues under dispute. It is in itself a neutral principle. 
It is true enough, of course, that judicial restraint 
offers only a general approach to jurisprudence and 
not a detailed blueprint for arriving at correct deci-
sions in disputed cases. Like the associated doctrine of 
original intent, judicial restraint constitutes a guideline 
rather than a formula. One cannot read the Constitu-
tion the way fundamentalists read scripture, looking 
for absolute assurance and precise prescription. At 
many critical junctures, the words of the Constitu-
tion-and the intentions of its authors-are neither 
self-evident in meaning nor amenable to definitive 
explication. In places where we might yearn for de-
tailed guidance we get only the expression of general 
principle. Judicial review remains an inescapably in-
terpretive, even subjective, activity in which men and 
women of equal legal acumen and constitutional schol-
arship will legitimately arrive at conflicting conclu-
sions. 
When we add to these considerations the common-
sense knowledge that fallible judges will often practice 
judicial restraint when it coincides with their policy 
preferences and find ingenious constitutional excuses 
for not doing so when it does not, we can understand 
the arguments of those who see the doctrine as an 
exercise in mystification and obfuscation. Judicial m-
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terpretation, they insist, is inevitably a policy-making 
process in which the personal biases of judges will 
necessarily intrude, and it would be better to face that 
reality directly rather than indulge in self-deceiving ef-
forts to pretend that it is not so. 
Yet if judicial restraint is not by itself a sufficient 
judicial philosophy, it would seem to remain a neces-
sary one. How else avoid the imposition of an imperial 
judiciary that feels itself unconstrained by democratic 
presuppositions? How else, to be more specific, avoid 
the jurisprudence by whimsy of a Roe v. Wade, which 
constructed a new constitutional doctrine out of sheer 
judicial willfullness, or the improbable constitutional 
construance of a Justice Brennan, who finds the death 
penalty a "cruel and unusual punishment" within the 
meaning of the Eighth Amendment even though the 
Constitution elsewhere makes explicit provision for 
capital punishment? 
Those who argue that the impossibility of pure ju-
dicial objectivity makes judicial restraint untenable 
have no more plausible a case than those Christians 
who would argue that their inevitable inability to exer-
cise pure altruism justifies abandonment to unre-
strained self-indulgence. We need perhaps most of all 
those ideals we find it impossible fully to live up to. 
What, then, of the Bork case? Those who oppose his 
judicial philosophy, or find him regularly inconsistent 
in its application, have every right to oppose him, 
however qualified or even exceptional they might on 
other grounds concede him to be, but those who 
would reject him simply because they find that his 
philosophy leads to uncongenial policy results would 
by implication reduce our judicial system to a raw 
struggle for power that will sooner rather than later 
destroy the nation's faith in constitutional democracy. 
It is distressing to find so much of the early opposition 
to Bork consisting in disingenuous exercises in dubi-
ous faith, as in the largely sophistical attacks to which 
he has been subjected in the New Yorker and the New 
York Review of Books. 
Some of Bork's detractors oppose him on the pecul-
iar grounds that he is not a "moderate," as if only 
those who locate themselves in the equivocal middle 
display fit judicial temperament or as though there 
were some unspoken constitutional doctrine that the 
Court must at all times maintain perfect ideological 
balance. (Where were such critics during the days of 
the Warren Court?) To argue in this way is in effect 
to nullify any President's right to nominate candidates 
who fit his judicial preferences. 
There is, finally, a political pitfall of which Judge 
Bork's opponents in the Democratic party ought to be 
more aware than many of them appear to be (and we 
offer this, however unlikely it may seem, in a nonpar-
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tisan spirit). For some time now, the Democratic party 
has labored under the disabling suspicion that it is ex-
cessively responsive to extremist or marginal elements 
in national politics. It will continue to be difficult for 
Democrats to elect a President if they are perceived as 
a party captive to the demands of feminists, racial 
militants, gays, and ideological purists. 
Much of the opposition to Bork has the mood of 
McGovernism revisited. (See, for example, Senator 
Kennedy's semi-hysterical outburst on the day the 
nomination was announced.) It might very well lead to 
the same results. The more the struggle over the 
nomination becomes, as indicated at the outset, a study 
in symbolic politics, the more likely are the Democrats 
to come to grief over it. Cl 
Dorothy Czamanske, 1905-1987 
The loss of Dorothy Czamanske last spring of heart 
failure is one that all of us associated with The Cresset 
feel deeply. We have lost a good friend and a valued 
colleague. We join with her family in mourning her 
departure. 
She was a pious Christian and a demon copy editor. 
Those ascriptions may seem more alien to each other 
than they actually are. Her Lutheran Christian faith 
anchored itself in a scriptural affirmation from which 
she never wavered. As eagle-eyed copy editor, she 
held with fundamentalist conviction to her second 
scripture: Kate Turabian's Chicago Manual of Style. She 
clung to the latter, as to the former, as a rock of cer-
titude in a relativistic world. 
Her husband Palmer was for many years a professor 
in Valparaiso University's Department of English, and 
she held as he did to a firmly prescriptive approach to 
the understanding of English grammar. After Palmer 
died, she served under three different Cresset employ-
ers-Kenneth Korby, Richard Lee, and the presented-
itor-as guardian of the grammatical proprieties. She 
was never a latitudinarian . When her putative 
superiors erred in that direction. she accepted their 
derelictions with resigned good grace, but also with an 
unmistakable air of gentle reproval. Her mastery of 
the rudiments and rules of style made her for years 
the editor and typist of choice for members of the uni-
versity faculty preparing their dissertations for final 
approval. 
Dorothy Czamanske loved the English language and 
served it vigilantly and faithfully. So also with her 
more important loves: family, church, university, com-
munity. She gave us all tough love and left us all the 
better for it. We will miss her. Cl 
The Cresset 
Richard John Neuhaus 
ABORTION AND PUBLIC DISCOURSE 
A Response to James V. Bachman 
(Editor's note: Last March, The Cresset published james 
V. Bachman's "Of Pluralism, Truth, and Abortion: A Con-
structive Role for Skepticism in Public Discourse." In that 
essay, Pastor Bachman took issue with certain arguments put 
forward by Pastor Neuhaus. Herewith Pastor Neuhaus' re-
joinder.) 
I am grateful for Pastor Bachman's analysis of the 
ongoing abortion debate and of my efforts to contrib-
ute to that debate. I agree entirely with his statement 
that "What is wanted is a way to return careful, public 
reasoning to the public sphere, even and precisely 
where disagreement persists." And it appears we do 
not substantively disagree on what public policy should 
be with respect to abortion. He gives that question 
parenthetical mention in one sentence (literally within 
parentheses) but it is a sentence I can readily affirm: 
"In a debate about relative risks I would initially sus-
pect that, given our ignorance, it is preferable to risk 
prohibition of abortions of convenience than to risk 
free choice." 
But the gravamen of Bachman's extensive essay is 
not what abortion policy should be but how we should 
conduct the debate about what abortion policy should 
be. Before turning to the heart of his argument, how-
ever, at least two errors of fact should be noted. They 
are errors of fact that may indeed, upon closer exami-
nation, touch upon the heart of his argument. 
The first error is Bachman's repeated assertion that 
Roe v. Wade permits "first trimester abortions." Roe v. 
Richard John Neuhaus, who was awarded an honorary 
degree from Valparaiso University last May, is Director of 
The Center on Religion and Society in New York City. His 
most recent books include The Naked Public Square 
(1984) and Dispensations: The Future of South Africa 
as South Africans See It (1986). His new book, The 
Catholic Moment, is scheduled for publication by Harper 
& Row this fall. 
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Wade removes legal protection from the unborn up 
until the moment of birth. No reason for abortion can 
be required before "viability." In the final months be-
fore birth, a threat to the woman's health may be a 
prerequisite for obtaining an abortion, but a threat to 
health is defined very broadly indeed. So, while there 
are relatively few third trimester abortions, they are 
certainly permitted and are obtained when they are 
wanted and doctors are willing to do them. (Individual 
justices and the Court have subsequently acknowl-
edged the arbitrariness and disutility of the "trimester" 
as a concept.) 
Pastor Bachman repeatedly asserts 
that Roe v. Wade permits "first 
trimester abortions." In fact, Roe 
removes legal protection from the 
unborn up until the moment of birth. 
This question of fact is important because it bears 
strongly upon what Bachman calls the "risks" involved 
in policy options. Today the theory and practice jus-
tified by Roe v. Wade are, quite logically and routinely, 
invoked to justify infanticide and euthanasia. As is 
now very widely recognized, there is nothing in the 
reasoning of Roe v. Wade that limits the permissions it 
grants to the first trimester or, for that matter, to the 
unborn. 
The second error also has to do with Roe v. Wade 
and relates to both a reading of historical circumstance 
and of the nature of public moral discourse. Bachman 
repeatedly asserts that the debate over abortion policy 
had reached a political deadlock and moral impasse, 
and that this was the unpromising situation to which 
the Court had to address itself. I respectfully suggest 
that this depiction is contrary to fact. 
As an active participant in the "abortion liberaliza-
tion" debate of the 1960s that was underway in New 
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York and other states, I can assure Pr. Bachman that 
democratic political discourse regarding abortion was 
vibrant and tractable, if not always terribly elevated. 
Far from having run its course, the debate had hardly 
gotten underway before the Court peremptorily re-
moved it from the "public reasoning in the public 
square" that Bachman and I both favor. 
It is a matter of record that the pro-liberalization 
forces were stunned--even if delightedly stunned-by 
the sweeping nature of the Court's 1973 decision. As 
the great constitutional scholar John T. Noonan has 
observed, the Court did not liberalize abortion law, it 
abolished abortion law-a step unprecedented in the 
history of western jurisprudence. It is also no secret 
that many who favored "liberalized abortion" at the 
time have had second thoughts about the "victory" 
handed them by the Court. They wanted abortions to 
be available in "extreme circumstances." They did not 
envision 1.5 million abortions per year and the almost 
20 million unborn lives terminated since Roe v. Wade. 
The essential point, however, is that the impasse in 
democratic discourse described by Bachman was not 
the situation addressed by the Court; it is the situation 
created by the Court. And the impasse now is not in 
democratic discourse with respect to abortion; it is an 
impasse--one hopes a temporary impasse-in resolv-
ing the conflict between the imperial judiciary and the 
democratic political process. This question has every-
thing to do with Bachman's reading of the possibilities 
and limits of public reason and persuasion. 
There is a second part to what I have described as 
Bachman's second error. Perhaps this second part is 
more in the nature of an attendant question. Bachman 
writes that the Court was correct in saying that, with 
respect to when life begins, "when those trained in the 
respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and 
theology are unable to arrive at any consensus, the 
judiciary, at this point in the development of man's 
knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as to the 
answer." 
But then Bachman acknowledges that the Court did 
in fact give an answer, and it was a "reductionist" an-
swer of which he disapproves. Had he a better reading 
of the history of the debate (see above) , Bachman 
might have concluded that, in the absence of a "con-
sensus" either among the public or among specialists, 
it would have been the better part of wisdom for the 
Court not to decide the question as it did, perhaps not 
to decide the question at all. Not even the forces that 
brought the case were asking the Court to abolish 
abortion law. 
Even more seriously, Bachman (borrowing the 
phrase from John Rawls) says the Court respected the 
"veil of ignorance" which had "descended upon con-
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temporary public debate about abortion ." With the 
Court, Bachman thinks evidence of such a veil of igno-
rance is the absence of "consensus" among relevant ex-
perts. On many questions of consequence, however, 
experts are "unable to arrive at any consensus." Are all 
such questions therefore to be removed from public 
discourse and decision? And where would that leave 
the theory and practice of a system of representative 
democracy such as we claim to have? Bachman says 
the argument he is making about the abortion debate 
applies more generally to other debates over public 
policy. If he really does agree with the hapless piece 
of reasoning that he cites from Roe v. Wade, it is to be 
feared that his complaint is with democratic polity itself. 
So far I have suggested that Bachman's admirable 
intention is marred by two errors, the second of which 
raises the several questions mentioned. The construc-
tive part of Bachman's effort is in the proposal that 
there are four distinct moral modes, so to speak, in 
engaging public policy debate, and the abortion debate 
in particular. There is the moral skeptic (which is how 
he identifies himself), there is the moral absolutist (ap-
parently proponents of natural law and universal 
reason belong here) , there is the moral relativist (he 
says the present writer belongs here, when he is not 
being an absolutist), and then the moral reductionist 
Possum 
On a flat, white rock at mid-day we found her, 
an unmoving ridge parting ceaseless waters. 
My cousin and I stood knee-deep, 
child footed on uneven stones, 
noon flared all around us, 
this unexpected island taking us separately. 
We lacked language strong enough 
to bury the possum. 
We left her there, afraid to touch, 
thinking death itself contagious. 
When Steve died 
I blinked at the blueness 
of his burial suit, 
saw the straight spine of his mother 
who chose three hymns 
for us to sing while we wept, 




(who, properly in my judgment, gets short shrift). 
The way that Bachman sets up his four categories is 
intriguing, even if so confusing as to raise the question 
as to whether they are fundamentally confused. There 
is also a piquant touch in that Bachmn wickedly mixes 
up the conventional categories for thinking about moral 
actors in the public arena. For instance, the Jerry Fal-
well types, who are ever railing against relativism, end 
up as relativists all in Bachman's scheme of things. 
But we should step back a moment and get a firmer 
fix on Bachman's four moral modes. The "skeptic" 
thinks there is a true answer to the question, but also 
thinks we probably don't have that true answer. (The 
question in question would seem to be the question 
about the beginning of human life, although this be-
comes ambiguous as the essay proceeds.) The "ab-
solutist" says there is a true answer and all human be-
ings are capable of giving it. The "relativist" says there 
are several truths in play, and works to make sure that 
his truth prevails. The "reductionist" claims that all 
talk about moral truth is no more than a smokescreen 
for something else, usually self-interest. 
So there are Pr. Bachman's four types. The skeptic 
is the good guy, the absolutist may be well intended 
but is stubbornly wrongheaded, the relativist may be 
sincere but tends to be slippery and manipulative. As 
for the reductionist, enough said. 
"An absolutist would argue that there is one true ac-
count about whether abortion in the first trimester is 
right or not and that this truth can be publicly deter-
mined and shared," Bachman writes. What is meant by 
"right or not" is not explained. Presumably, it is not 
"right" if it is the taking of an innocent human life. As 
an exmple of absolutism, Bachman cites my citation of 
James Burtchaell of Notre Dame. Burtchaell argues 
that Christian "wisdom" with respect to abortion is 
publicly accessible. That is, properly argued, it will be 
convincing to reasonable people who are not Chris-
tians. In this respect, Burtchaell embraces a natural 
law position that is deeply compatible with a Lutheran 
understanding of natural reason, civic righteousness, 
or orders of preservation. 
It does seem a bit mischievous of Bachman to dub 
this the "absolutist" position, considering the pejorative 
connotation of "absolutism" in our culture. The po-
sition represented by Burtchaell is in fact the single 
most venerable tradition of moral reasoning in western 
civilization, threading its way from Aristotle through 
Paul, Augustine, Maimonides, Thomas, Luther, Cal-
vin, and up to a good many religious and secular think-
ers today who persist in believing that moral discourse 
is a human possibility. 
In any event, while grudgingly admiring the "ab-
solutist," Bachman thinks his is a lost cause and he 
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should therefore adopt the "skeptic" mode in public 
discourse. Bachman asks in italics, "What public stance 
should a rational person take when he recognizes that his pri-
vate convictions cannot command rational agreement in pub-
lic discourse?" Bachman's answer is that he should take 
a "skeptic" stance. 
But Bachman's question is filled with difficulties. 
The whole point of the argument advanced by people 
such as Burtchaell is that theirs is not a "private" con-
viction. In addition: What constitutes "rational agree-
ment in public discourse"? Unanimous agreement? 
Majority agreement? Consensus? Are we talking about 
agreement in public opinion or among significant par-
ticipants in the discourse? And how would the propo-
nent of reasonable public moral discourse determine 
that his argument "cannot" command agreement? 
The participant whom Bachman 
describes as the "absolutist" might 
better be called a moral philosopher. 
In the abortion debate he attempts 
to make the public case for what 
he believes to be the truth (not 
simply "his truth"). 
With respect to the debate over abortion policy, one 
might suggest that the measure of agreement required 
is a politically effective convergence of moral judg-
ments and interests strong enough to secure an accom-
modation that, while entirely satisfactory to few, will 
be compatible with the values of a democratic and 
pluralistic society. Contra Bachman's "cannot," there is 
every reason to believe such an agreement could be 
achieved, absent the Court's preemption of democratic 
deliberation. There is also every reason to believe that 
those who make the kind of argument which Bachman 
describes as "absolutist" can contribute, as they indeed 
have contributed, to achieving such agreement. 
The actor whom Bachman describes as the "ab-
solutist" might better be called a moral philosopher. In 
the abortion debate he attempts to make the public 
case for what he believes to be the tru th (not simply 
"his truth"). In this sense he is no different from the 
"skeptic" Pr. Bachman, who is, after all, attempting to 
make the case for the truth of what we know, or do 
not know, about the truth. As to whether the moral 
philosopher can in fact convince others, the debate 
isn't over until it is over. (And the debate over the 
questions raised by abortion will not, God willing, be 
over in our lifetime.) In that debate the role of the 
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"relativist" is as troubling as Bachman says. 
Here too, however, there is considerable confusion 
in Bachman's description of the "relativist" category. 
The relativist allows that there are a number of truths 
in contention and is only concerned that his truth pre-
vail in public policy. He "will not waste his effort try-
ing to reason with his opponents" but will use "all the 
tools of persuasion" to carry the day politically. 
Bachman says the relativist will, for strategic reasons, 
allow that conflicting positions are "falsehood free." But 
that seems exceedingly improbable, since anyone who is 
trying to persuade people of his position is not likely to 
allow that opposing positions are free of falsehood. 
Bachman's proposal for recasting the 
abortion debate in terms of risk is 
ingenuous (not, please note, 
disingenuous). For two decades 
innumerable prolife advocates have 
in fact been urging their opponents 
to entertain the "what if" question. 
In fact those whom Bachman calls "relativists" do 
not make that allowance at all. Bachman's relativists 
are more readily recognized as absolutists, in the 
pejorative sense of the latter term. They reject the re-
sponsibilities of public reason and persuasion (persua-
sion being a perfectly respectable term, despite 
Bachman's peculiar way of using it) because their 
"truth" is essentially derived from private sources. For 
the fundamentalist "prolifer," that truth is derived 
from divine revelation which is not subject to public 
reason. For many "prochoice" proponents, that truth 
is coterminous with individual convenience or fulfill-
ment and protected by the dogma of privacy. By de-
clining the obligation of genuinely public discourse, 
both of these absolutists (whom Bachman unhelpfully 
calls relativists) do indeed, as Bachman writes, under-
mine "the virtues of democratic pluralism" and 
threaten "a return to the tyranny of the majority." 
One of the central arguments of my The Naked Pub-
lic Square, which Bachman cites, is precisely the danger 
posed by this privatization of moral discourse. I con-
tend there and elsewhere that questions of great moral 
moment should not be decided by the counting of 
noses but by the weighing of arguments. If Bachman 
thinks we disagree on that, he has seriously misun-
derstood my argument. Of course in democratic deci-
sion-making with respect to policy, it does at some 
point come down to counting the noses of those per-
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suaded by the arguments. Democracy is a very messy 
and inelegant process, and the danger of raw 
majoritarianism is very real. 
In the case of abortion, however, I think the alterna-
tive danger of elite hostility to democratic discourse 
and decision is more real and, in fact, has temporarily 
triumphed. (I mean by "elite" what some have termed 
the new knowledge class, as embodied in, for example, 
the judiciary, the prestige media, and dominant in-
stitutions of higher education. Survey research over 
the years is fairly consistent in indicating that about 20 
per cent of the population would outlaw all abortions, 
somewhat under 20 per cent favors the policy now es-
tablished by Roe v. Wade, and the rest believe the un-
born should be legally protected, with abortion al-
lowed in relatively rare "extreme cases.") 
With Bachman, I insist that arguments for public 
policy should be genuinely public arguments. But ar-
guments do from time to time issue in policy decisions 
which, if they are to be democratically legitimate, must 
be supported by a widespread sentiment that is not to 
be confused with a "tyranny" of the majority. And 
this, of course, is true of all law, not simply law rela-
tive to abortion. 
I have suggested, then, that Bachman's "absolutist" 
is in fact a publicly engaged moral philosopher and his 
"relativist" is in fact an absolutist who makes public 
moral discourse very difficult. I pass over his third cat-
egory, that of the "reductionist," since it seems to me 
an essentially accurate description of one kind of actor 
in the current debate. However, his preferred category 
of the "skeptic" is, I am afraid, not very helpful either. 
It turns out that his skeptic is not very skeptical at all. 
His skeptic in fact knows a great deal about the truth. 
Consider, for example, Bachman's proposal for re-
casting the abortion debate in terms of risks. What, he 
asks, are the consequences if public policy is based on 
the hypothesis that abortion is wrong or on the 
hypothesis that abortion is not wrong? If abortion is 
not wrong but is prohibited, there is a serious infringe-
ment of freedom and attendant individual suffering. 
If abortion is wrong but permitted, millions of inno-
cent human beings are slaughtered. As indicated by 
his parenthetical remark mentioned earlier, the un-
skeptical Pr. Bachman knows perfectly well that it is 
wrong to slaughter innocent human beings. 
Bachman's proposal for recasting the abortion de-
bate in terms of risk is also ingenuous (not, please 
note, disingenuous). For two decades innumerable 
prolife advocates have been urging their opponents to 
entertain the "what if' question. For the sake of argu-
ment, what might be called a postulate of ignorance is 
routinely stipulated with respect to whether the un-
born are human beings with a claim upon societal pro-
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tection. The prochoice advocates just as routinely re-
fuse to take the bait. Knowing full well that the cal-
culus of consequences is devastating to their position, 
they, as Bachman notes at one point, promptly and 
understandably change the subject. The unskeptical 
Pr. Bachman knows that this is an evasion of truth and 
consequences. 
I also have no doubt that he knows that the abortion 
debate is not only about the moral status of the un-
born but drives to the heart of what we mean by polit-
ical and moral community. The question posed is: 
Who belongs to the community for which we accept 
common responsibility and provide legal protection? 
The inevitable next question is: By what criteria do we 
exclude one class of what is undeniably human life, in 
this case the unborn, without by the same criteria 
excluding others whom we do not intend to exclude? 
Some people, accepting Bachman's 
invitation to calculate the 
comparative risks, will think it 
morally intolerable that it may be 
that in the United States of America 
approximately four thousand babies 
are killed each day. 
Pr. Bachman does himself a disservice. By insisting 
upon the truths at stake in the abortion debate, he dis-
closes that he is no skeptic at all. What he unfortu-
nately calls skepticism, it seems to me, is a measure of 
modesty about what we can claim to know for sure 
and a devotion to civil discourse in the public square. 
As attractive as they may initially appear to be, three 
of Bachman's four categories do not stand up under 
closer examination. His "absolutist" is a publicly en-
gaged moral philosopher, his "relativist" is an ab-
solutist who is indifferent to the protocols of public 
discourse, and his "skeptic" is an intelligently modest 
practitioner of civic virtue. However, were it simply a 
matter of addressing conceptual confusions or of cor-
recting Pr. Bachman's misunderstanding of my po-
sition, his essay would not warrant this extended re-
sponse. But the essay may have the unfortunate conse-
quence of throwing cold water on vigorous engage-
ment in the abortion debate. 
Bachman's conclusion is that people "should join the 
skeptic in arguing that there is genuine truth and in 
fiercely opposing those who seek to crusade in its 
name." Bachman is very unskeptical in knowing that 
there is genuine truth and in knowing the truth about 
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what people should do about it. Also, the call to 
"fiercely" oppose those who would crusade sounds 
very much like a call to crusade. But if by "crusade" 
he means impassioned warfare unchecked by reason 
and civility, then by all means let us not have a 
crusade. On the other hand, as Bachman seems not to 
appreciate, democracy is frequently a raucous project. 
Some people, accepting Bachman's invitation to cal-
culate the comparative risks, will think it morally intol-
able that it may be that in the United States of 
America approximately four thousand babies are kill-
ed each day. Others, on the basis of reasoning that is 
genuinely public in nature, have concluded that there 
is no "may be" about it. In either case, these people 
are likely to get a good deal more worked up about the 
situation than Pr. Bachman appears to be. Many of 
them may determine to try and do something about it. 
Pr. Bachman might call it a crusade. But it is simply 
the way that people in a democratic society attempt to, 
in his words, "return careful, public reasoning to the 
public sphere, even and precisely where disagreement 
persists." C: 
Iberia 
At the parking lot flea market, I bought 
a black-velvet banner like the one my aunt 
hung over her fireplace when I was a kid 
who believed that all things Spanish 
meant Spain. She would turn on the lamp 
which spun to look like flames, then light 
pine incense, safer than sparks and ashes 
she would always say, and dream about 
her grandmother's woodburning stove. 
The matador twirled the cape, daring 
the hull's heaving shoulders which shrugged off 
the death he could smell in paint chips. 
The tapestry became my travel poster, dispenser 
of Mediterranean truths, as I planned 
my escape. After high school, at a World 's Fair 
fiesta in Coney Island, I ate chicken tacos 
for the first time, gawked green-eyed 
at the jet braids of Chicanas who trilled 
their r's like castanets, thinking I could 
still practice Castilian, lisping a seabreeze 
in a Valencia orange grove. 
Martha M. Vertreace 
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Renu Juneja 
GROUNDS WE STAND ON 
Varieties of Exile & the West Indian Experience 
There is a story about an Arab (or an Indian or an 
African) that reappears with a changing cast over dif-
ferent parts of the world. I originally heard it in 
India; more recently, I heard it again in Trinidad ; and 
it may be significant that I have never heard it in the 
West. An Arab and, shall we say, an Indian are travel-
ling together through Arabia. They are moving away 
from a town when the Indian is surprised to see his 
companion repeatedly stop and look over his shoulder 
towards the town they have just left behind. Finally, 
after the tenth such incident, the Indian asks the 
Arab: "Nasser, what are you doing? What are you 
looking for?" And Nasser, unperturbed, responds: 
"I'm waiting for my soul to catch up with me." 
The story is sufficiently enigmatic to have many 
meanings. Essentially about self-division, it refers to a 
kind of sensation familiar enough for those who are 
not at home for whatever reason-a discomforting 
sense of disjunction between the space inhabited by 
the body and by the soul. We are not fully present to 
the present place or time because part of us is still 
somewhere else. 
Such feelings are characteristic of experiences of 
homelessness and exile, and common enough in 
human history whenever people have left home struck 
by wanderlusts or driven from a life no longer accept-
able. In a primary myth of Western civilization, Adam 
and Eve find themselves dispossessed of that magically 
nurturing environment we term home; they must wan-
der, as must their descendents, in a state of perpetual 
exile. The condition, indeed, has been regarded as so 
universal that philosophers like Sartre and Camus 
Renu Juneja has recently returned to the Department of 
English at Valparaiso University from a sabbatical leave in 
the British West Indies. She is a frequent contributor to The 
Cresset. H er most recent essay, "Of Sabbaticals, Work, and 
Time: Reflections on Cultural Marginality," appeared last 
February. 
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have constructed a paradigm of human existence 
through metaphors of exile. 
Of the dangers of asserting cross-cultural universal-
ity we are now fully aware through the recent formu-
lations of cultural anthropology. No aspect of human 
existence appears in timeless isolation. No event is free 
of wider political realities and no behavior innocent of 
the larger cultural context. So, too, the cross-cultural 
experience of exile should not obscure that these ex-
periences express very different social and moral 
realities. The causes, the effects, the preceding and re-
sultant attitudes to exile transform the reality of this 
apparently universal experience. 
Let us take some specific instances of exile. For the 
Jews during their Babylonian exile, the pain and grief 
of dispossession is made bearable by two factors: what 
has happened is not altogether inexplicable and need 
not, will not, be final. If Yahweh's anger has caused 
their being driven away from home, then it is also an 
anger which has been merited. God's will has caused 
the exile and in God also lies the hope. God will-
when human suffering is sufficient, repentance sin-
cere, divine anger diminished-lead the people back 
home. Such is the understanding promoted by the 
prophetic writings of Jeremiah, Ezekiel, and Isaiah, 
and such the belief which sustained Jews through cen-
turies of diaspora-a view of history that now pro-
motes what some perceive as a somewhat excessive de-
votion to the notion of Israel as a divinely-sanctioned 
homeland. One of the supreme ironies of our century 
must be that the exiled, wandering Jew, almost 
paradigmatically homeless, should now render the 
Palestinian Arabs homeless. 
With some other religious exiles, however, this 
search for home has been a very different experience 
with different consequences. Most notably, the many 
sects of Protestant refugees fleeing Europe for the 
New World were not only leaving home, they were 
also going home. Perhaps for this too there is a paral-
lel within the paradigmatic Jewish experience. During 
Exodus, when the Jews were both driven from and 
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chose to leave Egypt, for many this separation must 
have felt like leaving an accustomed if confining 
home. But even as the Jews were driven from Egypt 
they were drawn to Canaan. So, too, were the Puritans 
both driven from England and drawn to the Americas 
by the promise of religious freedom, a journey that 
the Puritan poet Andrew Marvell envisions as almost 
a return to the lost Edenic home: 
Where the remote Bermudas ride 
In the ocean's bosom unespied, 
From a small boat, that row'd along, 
The listening winds received this song. 
What should we do but sing his praise 
That led us through the watery maze, 
Unto an isle so long unknown, 
And yet far kinder than our own? . 
He gave us this eternal spring, 
Which here enamels everything 
And sends the fowls to us in care . 
He makes the figs our mouths to eat 
And throws the melons at our feet .. 
"Bermudas"' 
The New World is now too well populated and too 
well sustained by a manifest cultural system to appear 
the Eden we can shape to our dream. Unlike the 
seventeenth-century immigrants, modern immigrants 
to America must seek to adapt to, fit into, an existing 
society. But like the Puritans, the twentieth-century 
immigrants have chosen to leave their home, although 
now the motivations are overwhelmingly economic. In 
such an exile there is little discontent. These people 
now are where they want to be. 
Their worlds of memory and dream may remain 
haunted by a landscape left behind, but their con-
scious and public pronouncements are usually filled 
with almost cloying gratitude for being here-a profes-
sion of gratitude that the society they have joined ex-
pects and even demands. Many, of course, remain, 
mentally if not physically, holders of dual passports. 
Some are even vaguely self-divided. Nonetheless, all 
make a willing and determined effort to assimilate by 
acquiring the language, mannerisms, modes of be-
havior, attitudes, and values of their new home. 
In contrast, one of the most shattering varieties of 
homelessness must be the one induced by colonialism, 
a condition which is not only a geographical fact but 
also a state of mind. Without adequate recorded tes-
timony, estimates of the effects of the Roman Empire 
or Greek slavery must remain at the level of inference 
and extrapolation. With the more recent instances of 
European colonialism the consequences are easier to 
'Andrew Marvell, Complete Poetry (New York: Random 
House, 1968). 
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analyze because, in some measure, they are still with 
us. 
First, there was the spiritual dispossession of those 
who continued to live in the territory they regarded as 
home. For the people of Asia and Africa, for instance, 
this possession by a race and civilization so alien from 
their own induced a kind of schizophrenia among 
those brought into contact with the imperial race. At 
the most extreme ends of the spectrum, as for instance 
in island societies where the smallness of the territory 
made reservation culture impossible, we note the 
tragic consequences of this spiritual dispossession-the 
near extinction of the Arawaks in the West Indies and 
the total extinction of the Tasmanians in the Pacific. 
One of the most shattering varieties 
of homelessness must be the one 
induced by colonialism, a condition 
which is not only a geographical 
fact but also a state of mind. 
In his recent book, Victorian Anthropology, George 
Stocking, Jr. describes the history of the Tasmanians. 
The final phase of the colonizer's dealings with the 
Tasmanians (after the killing and the raping) was an 
effort to civilize them through the force of the Protes-
tant ethic. The reports of the first Christian missionary 
claimed that the work of Christianizing and civilizing 
was succeeding. "Instead of 'wandering about the set-
tlement with listless and careless indifference,' the Tas-
manians were now wholly employed in useful labor, 
harmless amusements, religious exercises, and atten-
dance at school ... those who could afford them now 
ate with knives and forks." As Stocking writes, there 
was "one 'serious drawback to the success of the estab-
lishment.' Though 'every advantage of civilized life' 
had been afforded them, the Tasmanians persisted in 
dropping off like flies."2 Within a single generation 
they were extinct. 
In larger territories, the effects were, perhaps, not 
so extreme. Life in the remote villages of India or Af-
rica may have continued virtually unaltered, except for 
certain economic and political consequences often only 
dimly comprehended. The urban, middle-class elite, 
however, were forced to acquire an alien language and 
through it the values of the culture of which the lan-
guage was a product. The process of disorientation 
was, as we have seen with the Tasmanians, not merely 
an unplanned by-product of interaction. The Empires 
2George Stocking, Jr., Victorian Anthropology (New York: 
Free Press, 1987). 
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also had a manifest agenda of forcing the colonized 
out of their cultural perceptions of reality into their 
master's definitions of reality. 
And they largely succeeded. The differences with 
the Jewish exile are instructive. Even in their ghetto 
existence, the Jews never lost their identify as Jews, or 
their sense of self-worth supported by their firm belief 
in themselves as God's chosen people. Perhaps since 
the efforts at conversion came from a people not rad-
ically different in cultural values and schemes of real-
ity, the Jews were more successful in withstanding 
such pressures. In contrast, when the British left India 
and Africa, they also left behind a whole class of 
"brown Sahibs" (as they are called in India) and Afro-
Saxons, a class which also inherited the power of the 
rulers. 
Movements to win independence, by inculcating na-
tional pride, did ameliorate this spiritual dispossession 
among the educated, but the sense of inferiority inter-
nalized during colonial rule cannot be easily removed. 
Even when the infection is not so extreme, these are 
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in the wet autumn 
the lake fogs over in the wet autumn 
and the blue boats bump against the dock 
lost in the fine rain that spills 
out of the grey clouds 
in the cafe the counter man wipes 
the cups and tells the couple 
from Dubuque about the crowd 
that used to meet here 
in the 40's 
a light comes on in the house 
on the hill 
she parts the heavy curtains 
and watches the boats bump 
against the dock 
and thinks of lighting a cigaret 
the rain drenches the tall eucalyptus trees 
beside the cafe across the water 
and the blue boats fade 
in the gloom 
and go out 
J. T. Ledbetter 
people who have been acculturated into accepting 
Western notions of progress and Western models of 
development. The masters may have left, but their in-
stitutions survive to affect political, civil, and even the 
inner life of the former colonies. 
For the victims of slavery and indentured labor, the 
exile was both physical and spiritual. Since the slaves 
were captured from different tribes and language 
groups along the West African coast, they found it 
very difficult to retain a sense of identity gathered 
through group memory of history and tradition. The 
African slave, unlike the Jew, was deprived both of the 
past and the future. In also being deprived of lan-
guage, the slave was subjected to that total exile where 
the spirit is as homeless as the body. Imprisoned in an 
alien cultural system, the slaves lacked the binding 
force of mythology that lives through language and 
group memory and that, as Yeats says, marries us to 
rock and hill, making that particular ground our 
home. 
Given the extremity of deprivation, it may be point-
less to distinguish between better and worse kinds of 
slavery. But if such distinctions were to be made, one 
could argue that the West Indian experience of slavery 
was worse than the North American for several 
reasons. 
The white plantocracy of the islands continued for 
generations to view their stay in the islands as a tem-
porary exile. The sugar plantations for which the 
slaves were imported remained merely a source of in-
come which made gentlemanly living possible, once 
profits were gathered, back home in England. This 
New World, then, was never the Edenic haven of free-
dom for any group within its society, never a home 
away from home from the fetters of Egypt or Babylon. 
Within the islands, the Edenic metaphor only merits 
an ironic treatment, as, for instance, in Derek Wal-
cott's poem "New World."3 
So when Adam was exiled 
to our New Eden, in the ark's gut, 
the coined snake coiled there for good 
fellowship also; that was willed. 
Adam had an idea. 
He and the snake would share 
the loss of Eden for profit 
So both made the New World. And it looked good. 
Even when for most plantation owners absenteeism 
was no longer possible, when for most in reality the is-
lands were home and England merely a temporary 
sojourn, the tradition of what has been called 
3All citations from Walcott's poems are from Collected Poems 
1948-1984 (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1986). 
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psychological absenteeism continued. Those who could 
afford it sent their children to England for education. 
In 1774, Edward Long, in his History of Jamaica, 
lamented that those who return "regret their exile 
from the gay delights of London," and have "a riveted 
prejudice against colony life." "For the White Creoles," 
writes Kenneth Ramchand (The West Indian Novel and 
Its Background), "England was home, the West Indies 
was never the loved place. "4 The situation is not very 
different even after independence. With the recent 
overthrow of the party in power since independence, 
the former President of Trinidad and Tobago has re-
tired to England, where, presumably, he feels more at 
home. 
For the Black Rastafarians, the 
multi-racial Jamaica, where the 
economic and political power still 
resides with the colored elite, is 
Babylon, the place of unhappy exile. 
Ethiopia is the promised land. 
The gravest consequence of such attitudes was what 
Ramchand has termed "cultural absenteeism." In re-
fusing to regard the islands as home, the White 
Creoles failed to build a society with vital, living tradi-
tions and cultural forms. At best, what was available 
was the worst kind of cultural conservatism-the life-
less conservation of the European heritage. The ap-
propriate image would be of a child spiritlessly tap-
ping the keys of a piano, never fully involved in or re-
sponsive to the music, neither taking it in or giving 
anything back. 
The Caribbean slaves, then, were forced to exist in 
this vast vacuum. Circumstances of slavery denied the 
slaves much access to their own past, their history, 
their culture which could sustain them in exile, and 
through which they could build themselves a home 
away from home. Since the white rulers practiced a 
deliberate policy of breaking up family units, the 
slaves were even denied the elemental bonding be-
tween husband, wife, parents, children, siblings which 
could sustain a sense of belonging. The extremity of 
their condition was, as we may surmise, further 
exacerbated by living within a culture that failed to 
root and grow (and which, despite its sovereign po-
sition, remained a minority culture in population size) 
•Edward Long, History of Jamaica (London: 1774), Vol. 2, 
p. 248; and Kenneth Ramchand, The West Indian Novel 
and Its Background (London: Faber, 1970), p. 35. 
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in its self-imposed spiritual exile. When the massa was 
not home, the slave too remained homeless. 
Let us turn, once again, to the Jewish experience in 
exile, to one of the most poignant descriptions of this 
experience in Psalm 137: 
By the waters of Babylon, 
there we sat down and wept, 
when we remembered Zion. 
On the willows there 
We hung our lyres 
Without any changes, this could be sung by the 
"dreadlocked" Rastafarians of Jamaica, a Black religi-
ous cult which began in the 1930s, taking its cue from 
Marcus Garvey's impassioned statement that the Ne-
groes would now view God through their own specta-
cles, a black God instead of a white one. "We Negroes 
believe in the God of Ethiopia, the everlasting God-
God the Son, God the Holy Ghost, the one God of all 
ages. That is the God in whom we believe, but we shall 
worship him through the spectacles of Ethiopia."5 
The crowning of Ras Tafari in 1930, the great 
grandson of King Saheka Selassie, as i:he King of 
Ethiopia with the titles of Haile Selassie (Might of the 
Trinity), and the "Lion of the Tribe of Judah," pro-
vided the mythology for the Rastafarians. For the 
Black Rastafarians, the multi-racial Jamaica, where the 
economic and political power still resides with the col-
ored elite, is Babylon, the place of unhappy exile. 
Ethiopia is the promised land, the Zion, with Haile 
Selassie as the King who would arise from Jesse's root 
to liberate the people. The mythology has adapted to 
the overthrow and death of Haile Selassie without any 
loss of faith in Ethiopia as a spiritual home to which 
the Rastas await return. 
Yet whereas the Jews sang about what may be 
termed empirical history, the Rastafarians have man-
ufactured a history, whose spiritual validity one can-
not, of course, deny. The slaves did not come from 
Ethiopia, and return to Africa, even on the limited 
scale on which it has been attempted, seems impossi-
ble. Since the Jews have participated in a continuous 
history, they may go back to a home which lies in their 
past. Denied such history, and completely dislocated 
from the original society of which they are now an al-
tered fragment, the descendents of African slaves 
must remain in exile. 
Or more profitably, begin building a new home and 
a new society. The Trench Town Report, a survey of 
Rastafarians taken by the Jamaican government in 
1967, revealed that the majority of household heads 
5A. J. Garvey, Philosophy and Opinions, 2nd ed. (London: 
Frank Class & Co., 1967), p. 34. 
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interviewed wished to remain in the area. 6 This am-
bivalence of attitudes is predictable. These are people 
who are not at home in their present society, but who 
do not really have a home to which they can return. 
Like Nasser in the story, they must wait, in this case 
for their deprived body to catch up with their freer 
soul. 
The Caribbean islands are manufactured societies 
whose artificiality has delayed the process of an im-
ported people taking root in the portion of earth that 
is now their home. This unrootedness is characteristic 
even of those sections of the population that were al-
lowed to retain their history and their traditions. The 
East Indians, for instance, came to the West Indies as 
indentured labor to fill the vacuum of cheap, surplus 
labor for sugar plantations after emancipation had 
freed the slaves from a hated life they now, under-
standably, sought to avoid. The Indians were encour-
aged to live in isolated enclaves, and so were able to 
maintain a coherent tradition, even retain the lan-
guage for the first two generations. Although the 
dream of repatriation faded, India remained a 
spiritual home. 
But the passage of time forces an inevitable divorce. 
In significant irony, the most visible and audible signs 
of Indian heritage in Trinidad today are cinema 
billboards of vulgar, commercial films from Bombay 
and the blaring of movie songs from loudspeakers 
mounted on vans advertising these movies-songs 
sung in a language that most East Indian Trinidadians 
no longer understand. The pathos of this situation 1s 
captured by Walcott in his poem "Exile." 
When the God stamps his bells 
and smoke writhes its blue arms for your lost India 
the old men, threshing rice, rheum-eyed, pause 
their loss chafed by the raw 
whine of the cinema-van calling the countryside 
to it dark devotions. . . . The hymn 
to Mother India whore's a lie. 
To dream of a home you cannot return to makes 
you a perpetual exile. In any case, for a substantial 
number of the population, those of mixed ancestry, 
even these dreams are not possible. As the calypsonian 
Mighty Dougla (dougla is Trinidadese for an Afro-In-
dian) sang wittily many years ago: "If they serious 
about sending people back in true/ They going to have 
to split me in two." 
For sections of the post-colonial population for 
whom English, by whatever circumstances, has become 
the first and not the second language, the notion of 
•See Rex Nettleford's chapter on Rastafarians in Mirror 
Mirror Uamaica: William Collins & Sangster, 1970). 
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home remains a perplexing one. The language in 
which they dream embodies a landscape, an environ-
ment, a set of experiences very different from the 
landscape, the environment, and the experiences about 
which they dream. Even the most successful man-
ipulators of these conflicting realities are not free from 
confusions about home and, more importantly, those 
essentials of our consciousness secured by our sense of 
home--our sense of identity, of who we are and what 
we are. 
West Indian writers are culturally 
worse off than Black writers in 
America, who can annex themselves to 
a creative tradition even if the 
tradition has little to do with the 
challenges of being black in America. 
In the British West Indies, for instance, English is 
the only language, although some distinctions may be 
made between standard English, standard West-Indian 
English, and creole dialects. The peculiar colonial situ-
ation had thoroughly institutionalized the notion of 
England as home. Among the educated white and col-
ored population, as we have seen, no indigenous tradi-
tion of literature developed. Hence the West Indian 
writers (much like their counterparts in the musical 
arts of the calypso, the reggae, and the steelband) are 
in the process of creating, not sustaining, a tradition. 
In a sense, then, the West Indian writers are cultur-
ally far worse off than the Black writers in America 
who can annex themselves to a creative tradition, even 
if the tradition has little to do with the problems and 
challenges of being black in America. They can use 
that tradition to record their variant understanding of 
being American because, literally, they are at home in 
that tradition. Through language and education, the 
West-Indian writers belong to the English tradition, 
yet they are not at home in England-both because 
their home has been the islands and because they are 
not fully a part of the cultural system whose forms 
they learned by rote, a kind of book knowledge that 
can fail them at any time. Hence, for them, the situa-
tion seems more schizoid, subject to the kind of self-di-
vision that haunts Walcott in an early poem: 
I who am poisoned with the blood of both 
Where shall I turn, divided in vein? 
I who have cursed 
The drunken officer of British rule, how choose 
Between the African and English tongue I love? 
"A Far Cry from Africa" 
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The West-Indian writers, then, have until recently 
been in a spiritual if not physical exile. Most of them 
left the islands for England sometime in their careers, 
and many still reside away from the islands. (Canada 
and America, by virtue of a shared language, have at-
tracted some away from England.) Partly the reasons 
are economic. The economic dependence of the West 
Indies predicates that all books must first be published 
abroad. One of the consequences of the colonial situa-
tion has been a lack of audience for the writers in the 
islands, where, because of a lack of education, cultiva-
tion, and economic resources philistine attitudes 
tended to prevail. 
As Derek Walcott writes, "It is almost death to the 
spirit to try to survive as an artist under colonial rule, 
which hasn't really changed with our independent gov-
ernments."7 The writers are not only driven from the 
islands by such a situation, they are also drawn to Eng-
land. Walcott, again, describes the experience: 
the gulls who peck 
waste from the ploughed channel 
knew that you had not come home 
to England; you were home. 
Even her wretched weather 
was poetry. Your scarred leather 
held that first 
indenture, to her Word .. . 
"Exile" 
But very quickly comes the awareness that here, too, 
you are a stranger, shut out from the inner life of the 
people: "But the train/ soon changed its poetry to the 
prose/ of narrowing pinched eyes you could not 
enter." And the writer returns in memory to the home 
he has left behind: "an ochre trace of flags and carat 
huts opens at Chapter one . . . invisibly your ink 
nourishes/ leaf after leaf the furrowed villages" 
("Exile"). Walcott's testimony is not unique. "This is-
land is my shadow," writes Sam Selvon. He will take 
it wherever he goes. 8 
The act of returning home in memory affirms and 
validates part of one's identity that cannot be ignored 
whatever the distance travelled from that original self. 
Our earliest cultural preconceptions remain, for most 
of us, the grounds of our being. We may learn to be 
at home wherever we are if we can learn to be at 
home with these vestigial parts of ourselves. The West 
Indians, then, in struggling to define a home are also 
struggling to define an identity, as much, perhaps, as 
they are trying to gather an identity from their frag-
7Walcott, "Meanings," Savacou, no. 2 ( 1970), p. 45. 
8Sam Selvon, "Three Into One Can't Go," Wasafiri, Carib-
bean focus issue, p. 11. 
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mented, deprived past. 
Predictably, the West Indian artists are often preoc-
cupied with questions of identity. Vidia Naipaul's later 
fiction is obsessed with the inability of his characters to 
find an authentic self. His scathing depiction of West 
Indians as The Mimic Men (1967) is a despairing con-
frontation of the cultural marginality to which the 
Caribbean (and much of the colonial world) has been 
reduced. Lovelace and Selvon are more generous in 
allowing their characters to gather the self-assurance 
which arises from coming to terms with the past and 
the present, from being, finally, at home with oneself. 
At the level of folk art, too, the calypsonians and 
steelbands are asserting that a vital culture can be born 
from deprivation. "Out of pain," sings the calypsonian 
David Rudder, "our culture was born." As he sings 
this tribute to the panmaker (the steelbandsman), he 
testifies as well to that hunger for home and identity 
that propels the West Indian artist into art: "And from 
that hunger came a feeling ... that shaped the steel." 
The West Indian artist's self-situating response to 
forces of history and the dominant culture also illus-
trates the potential of an individual consciousness to 
free itself of a given hegemony. Humans are, after all, 
actors in their history and society. If, as Edward Said 
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has convincingly argued, culture is a "possessing pos-
session" with demonstrable powers to dominate, then 
a willed homelessness may even be necessary to free 
oneself of this "possession"-to allow our conscious-
ness to admit the Others, those alterities, that this cul-
ture has so strenuously kept out.9 I think now of 
Michael Foucault's vision of classical European culture 
as an institutionalized attempt to exclude what it 
deems insane. 
Finally, let me turn to an example that Said, a Pales-
tinian exile, offers of a Jewish exile from Nazi Eu-
rope-Erich Auerbach's writing of Mimesis in Istanbul. 
Said refers to Auerbach's apologia in the epilogue: "it 
is quite possible that the book owes its existence to .. . 
lack of a rich and specialized library. If it had been 
possible for me to acquaint myself with all the work 
that has been done on so many subjects, I might never 
have reached the point of writing." 
Said probes beneath this drama of modesty to un-
cover the pain of exile, but also the victory over the 
dangers of exile-not writing would have meant, as 
Said comments, succumbing to the "Joss of texts, tradi-
tions, and continuities that make up the very web of 
culture." But while this writing about the culture from 
which he is exiled staves off the possibility of becom-
ing decultured, such a monumental undertaking as 
Auerbach's ("the representation of reality in Western 
Literature") is only possible because of this distance 
from home (away from the weight of the tradition 
represented in libraries.) 
Said glosses his argument by referring us to Auer-
bach's essay, "Philologie der Weltliteratur." Here Auer-
bach asserts the need to gain distance from one's own 
culture: "The most priceless and indispensable part of 
a philologist's heritage is still his own nation's culture 
and heritage. Only when he is first separated from his 
heritage, however, and then transcends it does it be-
come truly effective." Auerbach cites Hugo of St. Vic-
tor to emphasize this need to separate oneself from 
home: "The man who finds his homeland sweet is still 
a tender beginner; he to whom every soil is as his na-
tive one is already strong; but he is perfect to whom 
the entire world is a foreign land ." 
Exile is not a threat if, like Auerbach, we can use the 
past. When the past is within reach, then whoever we 
are wherever we are, we can come home to the pres-
ent. Exile is an advantage when it liberates us from the 
stronghold of our natal culture, freeing us spiritually 
and intellectually. Or, to shift the metaphor, when it 
provides the distance which makes genuine critical in-
quiry possible. • • •• 
•Edward Said, The World, the Text, and the Critic (Cam-
bridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1983), p. 9. 
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Living on Hardscrabble 
Because coyotes are lean, we own them, 
beggars that prowl parched fields 
at midnight. At noon, if we stand 
too long in one place, our bootsoles burn. 
Only twice in my life such a drought, 
the last one years ago, before Saigon. 
Our crop that year was buzzards, 
like watermelon vines black 
after a frost. Now, Saigon blooms 
often in my dreams, rockets, 
monsoons too deep to wade, except awake. 
I stare at skies too peaceful to believe. 
I've told you all I saw, black words 
like hawks gliding on thermals. 
A man riding hardscrabble alone 
carries his rifle for rattlers. Killing's 
always in season, time enough for scruples 
back at the barn, skinning a deer 
that would have died hereafter. 
Our children sleep with only me 
to protect them, nothing I haven't 
saved them from for years. Coyotes 
fearing all evil on horseback 
come out at night, feeding on fawns. 
We dump all bales we can in dry pastures. 
And still they starve, deer stumbling 
down deep arroyos a hundred yards 
from the barn. Wherever deer go, 
coyotes are sure to follow, 
tuck their tails and slink to the dump 
where we save skinned bones for burning. 
Mending the barbed-wire fence, we wonder 
how many days until thunder, how many 
steers we should auction, how many 





No man is a hero to his dog. My 
little dog Linus, asleep under the 
desk as I write this, is proof of that. 
My pursuit of academic heroism, in 
the form of massive tomes and 
mighty books, impresses him not. 
Accomplished con artist that he is, 
any celebratory occasion of 
academic achievement is a bore un-
less there's something in it for him. 
Often, as I bend over quaint and 
curious volumes of forgotten lore, 
he will give me his why-are-hu-
mans-so-stupid look, as if to say, 
"Scribble, scribble, scribble, Mr. 
Combs? Another book, Mr. Combs?" 
It is humbling to be around a being 
so totally unimpressed with human 
conceits. 
Like most dogs, Linus hangs 
around because he knows a soft 
touch when he sees one, and is 
amused by these curious and pre-
tentious beings who seem to need 
so many superfluous and ephem-
eral things, like heroism. I wonder 
what Ollie North's dog thinks of 
him? 
The estimable Lt. Col. North re-
vived interest in heroes in the sum-
mer of 1987. Was he a "national 
hero" or not? Polls and TV discus-
sions about him seemed to indicate 
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that the country was split, indeed 
polarized: for some he was a bona 
fide patriot victimized both by his 
superiors, who saw him as a conve-
nient fall guy, and by members of 
Congress, with their dreary pro-
cedural objections to the adven-
tures of the hero. For others, he 
was a liar and a lunatic, the hero of 
the shredding machine, the secret 
bank account, and contra killing 
fields, self-wrapped in his own pa-
triotic last refuge, and protected by 
a Constitution and institutional sys-
tem for which he had nothing but 
contempt. 
I cannot recall a popular political 
figure since Senator Joe McCarthy 
that so divided opinion. Senator 
Paul Simon took the negative, say-
ing tht "no one deserves the hero 
rank who admits that he lied, he 
cheated, he shredded evidence, and 
he violated the laws of our nation 
he swore to uphold," and drew 
both boos and applause. Many 
others took the positive, and there 
was an "Ollie for President" boom-
let. Some could envision him as the 
kind of presidential hero we need, 
and others could see his election, 
should it occur, as proof of the de-
terioration of the Republic into 
Caesarism and reason to seek ref-
uge from political madness m 
Canada. 
Both fantasies, I suspect, reflect 
another great American ambiva-
lence, on the one hand the desire 
for heroes and on the other the 
fear of heroes. Heroes throughout 
history have often been "event-
making" people, mobilizing forces 
that effect great changes. But they 
are also dangerous, often leaving 
trails of fanaticism and blood and 
residues of skepticism about their 
utility. "Happy the land," despaired 
Bertold Brecht of the first half of 
the twentieth century, "that needs 
no heroes." 
There is something apocalyptic 
about heroes. Those who like them 
and want them see them resolving 
history, triumphing over inertia 
and compromise, at last emerging 
victorious over villains and fools. 
Those who fear them may want 
justice done, but not at the price of 
the heavens falling. President 
North might redeem the future for 
a sunlit American summer or for a 
dark global winter of war and 
death. 
The estimable Lt. Col. 
North revived interest 
in heroes in the summer 
of 1987. Was he a 
"national hero" or not? 
Or, more likely, he would find it 
impossible to do either. Heroes 
don't remain heroes very long if 
they can't bring off some prodi-
gious resolution to things-unless 
(and perhaps this was one of the 
keys to Olliemania) their heroism 
was somehow thwarted, betrayed, 
prevented by the petty and small-
minded or even sinister forces 
from the triumph of their will. 
North has a career ahead of him 
on the right-wing lecture circuit, 
forever ennobled and celebrated as 
the superman who, if given the op-
portunity, could have defeated the 
Sandinistas, overthrown the Iranian 
revolutionaries, and shot down Abu 
Nidal (recall that General Patton, 
one of North's spiritual ancestors, 
challenged General Rommel to a 
single combat tank duel, Patton in 
a Pershing and Rommel in a Pan-
zer, to decide the outcome of 
World War II). The best way to 
keep a heroic reputation intact is 
never having to prove it. 
So those who say that Col. North 
is a figure from the realm of myth 
and fairy tale are quite right. The 
heroic tradition does indeed in-
clude a thousand faces, archetypical 
figures that act out paradigms of 
heroism in ritual universes. And no 
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one is totally immune. Most of us 
in youth elevated athletes or movie 
stars to the status of gods. Perhaps 
we all have our own pantheons. 
And it is easy to see why on reflec-
tion. We are all trapped in our own 
existential ordinariness, in the daily 
round of frustration and humilia-
tion, often defeated by recalcitrant 
reality. 
The hero is above the mundane, 
defeats existence through his or 
her extraordinariness, is immune 
from doubt and compromise and 
failure, overcomes limits and rules 
through audacity and daring. The 
hero affirms for us some measure 
of human control over time and 
space, gives us the sense that at 
least for a moment in the sun, life 
can triumph over death, or at least 
death can be defied. We can all 
imagine ourselves in ideal universes 
performing heroic deeds. I myself 
have hit more home runs than 
Ruth and Aaron, hit for higher av-
erage than Williams and Boggs, 
fanned more batters than Feller 
and Ryan. 
For these reasons, then, it is easy 
to see how Col. North could be-
come an "alter ego" for old men 
like Casey and Reagan. They were 
bound by rules and procedure and 
"oversight"; Ollie could float above 
bureaucracies and committees, defy 
rules, come up with "neat" and out-
rageous ideas, risk death or capture 
in the palace of the Kingdom of 
Darkness. Perhaps he appealed to 
Reagan's private fantasies derived 
from his movie days of playing 
"Brass Bancroft of the Secret Ser-
vice ; certainly he could bestir 
Casey's memories of derring-do in 
the OSS. 
But the importance of North's 
heroic audacity became really sig-
nificant when he went public, that 
is, when he became a mass-
mediated personage, a face on T-
shirts, a haircut craze, an object of 
adoration and veneration. However 
contrived (and he did have a con-
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sultant who advised him on how to 
look and what "themes" to develop 
in his appearance on TV), his self-
proclamation was more "testimo-
nial" than testimony, and appealed 
to more than it repulsed. Joe 
McCarthy had been destroyed by 
appearing as the bully on TV, 
proving that television could be a 
politically subversive medium; 
North proved that TV could be a 
politically superversive medium if 
one's performance hit the right 
public chords. 
The hero is above the 
mundane, defeats 
existence through his or 
her extraordinariness, 
is immune from doubt, 
compromise, and failure. 
North's television coup d'etat we 
might term performance as pro-
paganda, making a heroic statement 
about what he, and by extension 
the country, should stand for and 
do, and the hell with the fickle and 
vacillating. Ollie strode boldly 
through the front door of the Con-
gress and defiantly told them, and 
us, that heroes act and that the nit-
pickers merely impede the hero 
from the completion of his quest. 
In a bad year for Marines, what 
with the Moscow embassy scandal 
and Stanley Kubrick's savage movie 
portrayal of Marine boot camp and 
Vietnam combat, North conjured 
up heroic memories. 
He was Clint Eastwood m 
Heartbreak Ridge, John Wayne in 
Sands of lwo Jima, Jack Webb in The 
D.l. He was clear-eyed, aggressive, 
and single-minded in the halls of 
the bleary-eyed, timid, and fuzzy-
minded. He was a master of single-
think and straight talk in the 
citadel of doublethink and double-
talk. He was an heroic individual 
defying and even lecturing a de-
cidedly unheroic institution, a body 
at worst obstructive and at best 
irrelevant to his unrepentant 
heroism. 
A lot of us loved it, and em-
braced him as an embodiment of 
our collective alter egoes, what we 
in our heart of hearts would love to 
do--flaunt convention, act without 
doubt, soar above the ordinary. 
The mythic Ollie is like Peter Pan, 
a child-king in a fairyland of 
beauty and menace who lives an e-
ternal adventure and who always 
defeats the Captain Hooks of the 
world. (Does this mean that Fawn 
Hall is Tinker Bell?) 
Such are the momentary satisfac-
tions of television performance. It 
was for many a performance to be 
savored, and North a figure to be 
treasured. But in the age of mass 
media, the performance principle 
may be good for one show and no 
more. 
In some ways, Oliver North is 
similar to Charles Lindbergh. In a 
celebrated article, John William 
Ward suggested the meaning of 
Lindbergh's flight. The flight came, 
he says, "at the end of a decade 
marked by social and political cor-
ruption and by a sense of moral 
loss .... A philosophy of relativism 
had become the uneasy rationale of 
a nation which had formerly be-
lieved in moral absolutes. . . . 
Lindbergh's chief worth was his 
spiritual value." Lindbergh became 
an instant mass-mediated hero be-
cause for his time he gave the 
country "a glimpse of what they 
liked to think themselves to be at a 
time when they feared they had de-
serted their own vision of them-
selves." 
Lindbergh was a more unwmmg 
and reluctant hero than North, but 
Ward's point is that Lindbergh flew 
the Atlantic at precisely the right 
moment. Lindbergh combined 
something of the mythic past (the 
lone individual doing something 
heroic) and the mythic future 
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(doing something heroic with new 
technology), giving the celebrating 
public the sense that he rep-
resented the survival of something 
valuable from the past useful for 
progress into an uncertain future. 
After that momentary celebration, 
however, he had served his pur-
pose, and even though a great fu-
ture in politics or whatever was 
predicted for him, he faded into 
relative obscurity (save, of course, 
for the kidnapping and murder of 
his child and his involvement in the 
America First movement, the latter 
of which tarnished his heroic 
image). 
North emerged as a hero at a 
moment of uncertainty somewhat 
similar to 1927. Both national and 
individual values and purpose 
seemed a bit unraveled, and some 
of the popular heroes of the age-
Lee Iacocca, Ivan Boesky, Jim and 
Tammy Bakker, Gary Hart-in 
moral eclipse. The ethos of the age 
seemed to have deteriorated into 
sheer opportunism, and a convicted 
murderer and the head of a pros-
titution ring got their stories on the 
national bestseller lists. TV news 
paraded a steady stream of influ-
ence peddlers, inside traders, in-
dicted public officials, and athletes 
caught with drugs. The Governor 
of Texas saw nothing wrong with 
payoffs to football players at a 
Methodist university. 
Just before the emergence of 
North 62 per cent of those inter-
viewed in an ABC-Washington Post 
poll said they thought things in the 
United States "have gotten pretty 
seriously off on the wrong track." 
Like Lindbergh, North gave us a 
heroic vision of what we should be 
at a time when we were not at all 
certain we ever would be. 
Unlike Lindbergh, there was 
much public division and ambiva-
lence about North. For some, 
North's attitude was part of what 
was terribly wrong at the present; 
for others, his attitude was what we 
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needed to put things right. The 
Iran-contra committee itself de-
bated the proposition that "the end 
justifies the means." When Con-
gressman Lee Hamilton chided 
North that "his attitude didn't 
square with the U.S. Constitution," 
North didn't seem to comprehend. 
Those suspicious of such heroics 
found that chilling. 
shadow government, with secret 
ideas about imposing martial law? 
Was he willing to burn the Ameri-
can village in order to save it? 
Would Ollie shred the Constitu-
tion itself? Could he not imagine 
any moral or political constraints 
on secret wars, unknown deals, and 
unaccountable funds? Did he con-
done an American state run by a 
Such nagging questions took a bit 
of the bloom off the Ollie rose, and 
the Republic seems destined to sur-
vive the little shaking that North 
gave it. For as Linus says, quoting 
Emerson (like George Apley, Linus 
finds that Emerson always has 
something capital to say about such 
things), every hero becomes a bore 
at last. North's volcanic heroism 
will no doubt be cooled by success 
on the banquet and book circuit. 
The Red Toyota Truck Event 
Amelia'd never studied mirrors much 
or even her reflection when she passed 
(at six-o-nine exactly, every morning, 
rain or shine) the Paradise Cafe. But 
yesterday's experience changed all that. 
Striding out the valley at, predictably, 
five-twenty-five, then over Widow Martin's 
fields towards town to, as she likes to put it, 
"Clear the head while Ledville sleeps," 
she sensed routine was to be somehow broken. 
Sure enough. Where Main and Union intersected, 
a red Toyota truck had stalled. Or waited. 
Its driver, half-hung out the window, grinned 
"Good mornin'" first, then "-darlin! " with 
his lips pressed so (never say I told) "suggestively" 
into a kiss, she never thought, well, 
should she answer, but only reddened while he 
whistled off with one well-muscled arm still 
hanging out, saluting. 
And so he doesn't know she 
missed the curb and stumbled kind of blindly north 
the wrong and, therefore, unrecorded way back home 
to check-the first time ever so-her 
entry, bedroom, bathroom, parlor mirrors. 
Lois Reiner 
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His zeal will be channelled into 
speechifying, but one suspects no 
future Administration will touch 
him, and the Pentagon dislikes 
such lone rangers. Running for 
Congress would be tantamount to 
joining the Iranian mullahs or 
Ortega's Politburo. More impor-
tantly, by the end of 1988 Ollie will 
be, as the kids say, history. He will 
find the people more fickle and 
vacillating than the Congress. 
On television, the North 
of now, spinning his own 
telegenic heroism out of 
video cloth, zealously 
banters on, inviting 
us to suspend belief. 
In any case, the North phenome-
non reminds us that there are 
deeply rooted desires among at 
least a segment of the American 
populace for heroes. But TV 
heroism like we saw with North is 
a fleeting thing, something fanciful 
and even a bit childish. In some 
ways, it all can be viewed as a 
harmless exercise in political im-
maturity. 
But I think there is a larger 
problem. With a few reservations, I 
concur with the school of thought 
in historical sociology that holds 
that the world is being emptied of 
authority. American Catholics ig-
nore the traditional authority of 
the Papacy; the Watergaters and 
Irangaters defy the institutional au-
thority of the Congress; after Hit-
ler and Khomeni charismatic au-
thority has been widely suspect. A 
mass-mediated hero like Lindbergh 
or North becomes a temporary sub-
stitute for our desire to believe in a 
human power to triumph over 
something. 
But such figures emerge pre-
cisely because of our concurrent 
desire to find authority and to dis-
20 
obey authority, to be both good 
and free. The present finds us in a 
mighty search for authority. Allan 
Bloom seeks it in the classics; 
evangelicals seek it in the Bible; au-
thoritarians seek it in the State; 
libertarians seek it in the Self. But 
for our century authority has been 
hard to sustain, largely because 
people define freedom as the ab-
sence of authority. North seemed 
oddly heroic because he combined 
an unshakable belief in the author-
ity of the Presidential state with his 
freedom to act beyond the rule of 
law or even the consent of his own 
authority figures. 
But the popular nerve that he 
struck in the summer of 1987 re-
vealed how much we want to be-
lieve in heroes, and how little we 
actually believe in authorities. 
North's attitude represented some-
thing of our own: he believed in 
heroism, but seemed to have little 
respect for authority, including his 
superiors, whom he gladly impli-
cated in wrongdoing. He may have 
done a great deal for heroism, but 
he didn't do much to increase 
popular faith in public authority. 
If it is the case that authority in 
the world is being steadily eroded, 
then we may see in the future the 
quick rise and fall of heroic self-as-
sertions, painless but stimulating 
substitutes that author their own 
performance but authorize noth-
ing. This could mean a televised 
political world that would be turbu-
lent and even bizarre, but not very 
stable. For if we are to witness a 
world in which instituted authority 
is the problem, and occasional 
heroism the solution, then the 
Norths of the future could wind up 
being more than harmless summer-
time amusements. 
On TV, the North of now, spin-
ning his own telegenic heroism out 
of video cloth, zealously banters on, 
inviting us to suspend belief. Linus 
snorts and goes back to sleep, un-
impressed. Smart dog. ~~ 
Contemporary 
Definitions 
Gail McGrew Eifrig 
As a public service, some 1987 
updates to your lexicon: 
civil disobedience 
a refusal to obey laws which the 
individual feels are unjust or bad 
laws. For such a refusal the indi-
vidual expects punishment, and is 
willing to endure it for the sake of 
pointing out the problems with the 
law. Remember the old story about 
Thoreau, in jail for not paying 
what he thought was an unjust tax? 
(Emerson : Henry, what are you 
doing in there? Thoreau: Waldo, 
what are you doing out there?) 
This is of course an old story. 
disinformation 
telling people what you know is 
not the truth, so that they will act 
on the basis of your version of the 
facts . This proceeding is apparently 
so common in government that a 
former student told me cheerfully 
that his job in Washington was "dis-
information-just for the summer." 
deniability 
a valuable feature of any ven-
Gail McGrew Eifrig, a member of the 
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ture, endeavor, or enterprise that 
the planner feels might turn out 
badly, enabling the person respon-
sible for the plan to say he didn't 
know anything about it. "Deniabil-
ity" has to be built in, or provided 
for, and thus it is by definition an 
indication of knowledge. If you 
don't know about something, you 
don't have a chance to plan for de-
niability. This may seem to be a 
new term, until you remember 
Eisenhower trying to work some 
deniability into the Gary Francis 
Powers case after the fact. 
freedom, democracy, liberty, truth, jus-
tice, and the American way 
a group of words with meanings 
far too difficult and complex for 
the ordinary American to worry 
about. If somebody wearing medals 
uses them, and says "sir," you can 




a condition of distrust about 
most important things (authority, 
politics, religion, eduction , art, 
medicine, etc.) which used to de-
scribe a stage through which young 
people passed on their way to 
adulthood, and now characterizes 
most of the people most of the 
time beginning as early as eight or 
nine years of age. 
residuals 
If you don't want to say "the 
profits from the deal," you can say 
"the residuals from the project" 
and sound just like an admiral. Or 
a lieutenant colonel. Or an ex-Iran-
ian residualeer. 
"I don't recall" 
a magical phrase that instantly 
exempts the speaker from any re-
sponsibility for what is being asked 
about. Try this phrase when the 
IRS asks about your deductions for 
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business expenses, or when your 
wife asks you what you did with the 
children you were supposed to 
bring home from camp, or your 
boss asks you what you did with the 
files on United Widget. (Nagging 
question: what was John Poindex-
ter doing at the time of the famous 
November finding that was so 
much more important than ·getting 
a presidential authorization for an 
arms-hostages deal that it obliter-
ated this business from his mind?) 
For important people, 
not telling the truth 
is called "withholding 
information," and is 
different from lying. 
That is because they 
are important people. 
shredder 
a machine that quickly and al-
most automatically gets rid of guilty 
secrets. Much easier and quicker 
than a confessional. A shredder 
means never having to say you're 
sorry. 
lying 
For ordinary people, lying is not 
telling the truth when you are 
asked to tell the truth. For impor-
tant people, not telling the truth is 
called "withholding information" 
and is different from lying. Be-
cause they are important people. I 
once babysat a little girl who with-
held information about what she 
had been doing in the kitchen for 
so long. She withheld it for some 
minutes, until she felt so bad and 
so guilty about having eaten up 
what was to have been everybody's 
treat that she came in wailing 
"Kooooool Aiiid!" This confession 
was news to nobody, since her 
whole face had been covered in 
cherry-colored dust the whole time. 
But then, she was only four, and 
apparently didn't have the sense to 
know that you can go on withhold-
ing information till the cows come 
home, never mind what is all over 
your face. 
shame 
a mysterious term, now so ar-
chaic that no definition has been 
found, though during the summer 
of 1987, numerous people experi-
enced symptoms that seem to indi-
cate that, whatever this term 
means, it hasn't quite disappeared. 
patriotism (God and .. .) 
"Although he is regularly asked 
to do so, God does not take sides in 
American politics, and in America 
disagreement with the policies of 
the government is not evidence of 
lack of patriotism. I want to repeat 
that. In America, disagreement 
with the policies of the government 
is not evidence of lack of pa-
triotism." Senator George Mitchell, 
D-Maine. 




guessing right figuring 
Pegasus by abacus 
reaching in-
to cookie jars 
what is 
to finger 
better tasted tongued 
than fiddled with 
•• •• 
Bradley Carpenter Davis 
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Signs of Theatre 
John Steven Paul 
There must exist no more sin-
cere expressions of "Eureka!" than 
those that follow a playwright's dis-
covery of a good theatrical idea. 
Given the number of times one 
hears people say in a sigh or a 
groan "this is like a play," one 
would think that there would be 
numberless ideas out there waiting 
to be dramatized . But the relative 
paucity of good plays over, say, 
2,500 years attests to the scarcity of 
really good dramatic ideas. 
Probably 60 per cent of a suc-
cessful play is a good idea. The 
summer production of The Signal 
Season of Dummy Hoy at Chicago's 
Commons Theatre was about 60 
per cent successful. That is to say 
that much of the production was 
poorly executed, unfocused, and 
dull. But the idea that playwrights 
Allen Meyer and Michael Nowak 
began with shone through the 
amateurish haze and recommended 
itself to us for reflection. 
William Ellsworth Hoy actually 
played professional baseball in the 
time before the sport had become 
the national pastime. He was a 
superb hitter and fielder , a fran-
chise player. Hoy was also deaf and 
John Steven Paul teaches in the De-
partment of Communication at Valpa-
raiso University and writes regularly on 
Theatre for The Cresset. 
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mute and, in an age less sensitized 
to the feelings of the handicapped, 
was nicknamed "Dummy." (A 
name, by the way, of which he 
came to be proud and preferred to 
"William.") 
Dummy Hoy broke in with the 
Oshkosh, Wisconsin baseball club 
of the Northwestern League. A 
good portion of Hoy's career was 
over by 1 900; he had matured with 
the sport. He came to Oshkosh be-
fore the number of bad pitches re-
quired for a base on balls was re-
duced from nine to four . Pitchers 
had yet completely to give up the 
underhand pitch in favor of an 
overhand delivery. Batters could 
call for a high pitch or a low pitch. 
There weren't many standard-
ized rules from league to league 
but there was a good deal of unrul-
iness among the players. Baseball 
had yet to become a business and 
most players had little more to gain 
than a bare living wage and the fun 
of playing. Though they wore uni-
form neckties on the field, most of 
these men had but little concern 
for civilized decorum or good 
sportsmanship. And, of course, 
their general tendency toward 
brutish behavior intensified when 
focused on a man who could only 
express himself with his face and 
hands. 
This situation invites sentimental 
treatment and too much of The Sig-
nal Season of Dummy Hoy is too pre-
dictable: the virtuous young man, 
ennobled by his handicap, is 
doubted by the crusty manager and 
mistreated by his despicable team-
mates. But through talent, determi-
nation, and love for the game, the 
deaf-mute goes on to a successful 
baseball career and is, much later, 
honored as one of the pioneers of 
the game. 
They say that the most impor-
tant day in Dummy Hoy's signal 
season was the day he convinced 
the umpire to accompany his barks 
of "ball" and "strike" with hand sig-
nals. As he faced the pitcher, 
Dummy couldn't read the call from 
the ump's lips. When he turned 
around to ask for a repeat, the 
pitcher would "quick-pitch" him be-
fore he could right himself. 
For a time, the other players, 
who were not so stupid that they 
didn't realize his value to the team, 
tried to relay the calls to Dummy 
from the coaching box: the right 
arm raised for a strike, left arm 
raised for a ball. But these dolts so 
often confused right and left and 
were so easily distracted that the 
relay system fai led. So it came to 
pass-the precise historical details 
are lost-that William Hoy ap-
proached an umpire directly and 
requested that he use hand signals 
for balls and strikes. The umpire 
granted the request and signs be-
came a part of baseball. 
Dummy Hoy actually 
played professional 
baseball in the time 
before it had become 
the national pastime. 
The power and depth of the idea 
of a deaf player who introduces 
signs to baseball is revealed when, 
in the crucial moment that Dummy 
makes his request to the umpire, 
several levels of meaning intersect. 
In that moment, 1) Dummy Hoy, 
who signs to communicate, re-
quests, in effect, that the u mpires 
speak his language; 2) baseball, 
which, along with the other major 
professional sports, entertains the 
rapt attention of so many Ameri-
cans, adopts an approach to com-
munication which is, 100 years later, 
part of the essence of organized 
sport; 3) Dean Patrick Cannavino, 
who portrays Dummy and who is 
himself deaf, is signing to Ken 
Kade, who portrays the umpire; 4) 
Cannavino and Kade, as actors, are 
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employing gesture, a sign system 
which, some would say, has always 
been more important to theatrical 
communication than the spoken 
word; 5) every other element of the 
theatrical mise-en-scene is com-
municating to the audience as a 
sign; 6) two signing interpreters, 
seated on stools upstage, are sign-
ing the spoken portion of the scene 
to the hearing-impaired members 
of the audience; and 7) two cul-
tures, the speaking culture and the 
signing culture, are confronting 
and communicating with one 
another. 
(1) On the first level this clash of 
cultures makes for simple but com-
pelling melodrama. Dummy Hoy 
against the baseball establishment. 
It's a natural. One of the team's 
scouts has discovered Hoy in Ohio 
and recognized his special ability. 
The scout figures that the special 
disability will be manageable. But 
the owners, managers, umpires, 
and players become annoyed when 
they realize that Hoy's handicap 
will require extra energy on their 
parts. And, he's different. Not only 
is he deaf, but he's intelligent, re-
fined, modest, and kind. Trouble-
some and different: good reasons 
to be rid of him. 
But Hoy wants desperately to 
play professional ball. Finally, he 
parlays his talent into a grudging 
respect and, in the penultimate 
scene of the play, he works a 
momentous compromise with the 
umpire (who is also a local judge). 
Now he will be able to compete on 
equal terms with full-facultied play-
ers. It is a civil-rights conflict with 
great dramatic potential. Look for 
the movie. 
(2) Most of us view our favorite 
sports on television. If we are 
blessed with good hearing, or cor-
rective appliances, the non-stop 
commentary may dull our sense of 
the extensive signaling by umpires, 
referees, managers, coaches, and 
the players themselves. But all one 
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need do is attend the ball park or 
the stadium to become newly aware 
that signaling is as much a part of 
sport as passing, pitching, or punt-
mg. 
Signs precede, accompany, and 
follow every action. Despite the fact 
that everyone can see the basketball 
swishing through the net, the ref-
eree raises a fist and two fingers to 
signal "two points." The system of 
football signals is arcane. A baseball 
third-base coach signaling to his 
batter could just as easily be prac-
ticing a break dance routine. 
Had I not known that 
Cannavino was deaf, I 
might well have thought 
that he was an expert 
and graceful signer. 
We can't help wondering about 
the origin of sports signals. Now we 
know. No doubt the explanation is 
part fact and part myth, but then 
myth has long been the starting 
point for drama. 
(3) I know very little about Dean 
Patrick Cannavino except for what 
I have read in his brief program 
biography. He has been deaf since 
birth. He has made one other ap-
pearance as an actor in Chicago. 
While he was studying theatre at 
the National Technical Institute for 
the Deaf in New York, he played in 
six major productions. 
What the program did not need 
to say was that he was handsome, 
agile, and easily the most interest-
ing actor on the stage. Since the 
program told me that Cannavino is 
deaf, I was aware that he had a 
special disability . While the other 
actors used their voices, tongues, 
lips , and so forth to speak, Can-
navino "spoke" with his body, his 
face , and his fingers. 
In general , there are three re-
sponses to the disabled performer. 
If his disability is distracting or pre-
vents the actor from fulfilling the 
requirements of the role, the audi-
ence responds negatively: they pa-
tronize, compensate, or try their 
best to ignore the distraction. Sec-
ond, the disabled actor may be 
good. Then most of the audience 
becomes unconscious of any differ-
ence in his performance. Had I not 
known that Cannavino was deaf, I 
might well have thought that he 
was an expert and graceful signer 
who had worked hard to under-
stand the role of Dummy Hoy. (I 
have seen fully-sighted actors play 
blind characters frequently, and if 
they're good enough I simply 
forget that their sightedness is a 
handicap.) 
Some disabled actors are able not 
only to transcend their physical 
condition, but to transform a dis-
ability into a special power. I recall 
the first time I saw the road com-
pany production of Children of a 
Lesser God at the Blackstone 
Theatre in the early Eighties. It 
was a generally fine production of 
this moving play, but what I re-
member most is the signing. Most 
of the company had trained with 
the National Theatre for the Deaf. 
Their swift and agile signing could 
not be spoken of merely in terms 
of expertise and grace, but of art. 
I knew nothing of the denotation 
of the signs and I was sitting in the 
balcony of the large Blackstone 
Theatre, but I recall their hands as 
butterflies, flitting and lighting. 
The signing itself became a 
metaphor for freedom of the spirit; 
talking, which some of the charac-
ters fiercely resisted, seemed clod-
dish and mundane by comparison. 
The special communicative 
power of another disabled actor en-
hanced the Goodman's recent pro-
duction of She Always Said, Pablo. 
Susan Nussbaum played Gertrude 
Stein in this exquisite theatrical 
meditation created by Frank Galati 
on the writing of Stein, the images 
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of Pablo Picasso, and the music of 
Virgil Thompson. Nussbaum ap-
peared Picasso's famous portrait of 
the seated Gertrude Stein come to 
life. 
She remained seated at all times, 
and managed her considerable 
movement by means of a motorized 
wheel chair. It occured too me only 
after quite a while that Nussbaum 
was actually unable to use her legs; 
she is paralyzed from the waist 
down. The juxtaposition of serene 
cerebration and active intellection 
was a perfect combination for 
Stein. The paradox of immobility 
in motion suggested the cubist art 
that she championed. 
(4) As Cannavino (Hoy) signed to 
Kade (the umpire) , they displayed 
two modes of communication in 
high contrast. As Kade struggled to 
make Cannavino understand 
words, his frustrated gesticulations 
increased, but his hands were no 
more persuasive than his tongue. 
Cannavino, accustomed to relying 
entirely on gesture, communicated 
more coherently. 
Spoken word and gesture do bat-
tle in the scene and may at times 
do battle within a single actor. An 
incompetent actor or a young actor 
at the beginning of a training pro-
gram will sometimes manifest a dis-
junction between the words he is 
speaking and the expressive motion 
of his body. The mind is making 
two efforts: one to move the body, 
the other to say the words that 
have been written by someone else. 
Much of acting training is devoted 
to healing that psycho-physical split 
and helping the actor to produce 
the word as a natural part of a 
physical action. 
For the signing actor, the 
"words" appear indeed to be phy -
ically connected to the rest of the 
body. There are no words to get in 
the way. Undoubtedly, during the 
time the mute actor is assimilating 
the text, the signing is similarly dis-
jointed. But the effort to fit the ac-
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tion to the word must be more nat-
ural. For the signing actor, the 
word is a finger on the hand of 
gesture. 
(5) Two twentieth-century theo-
rist-artists, Antonin Artaud and 
Bertolt Brecht, not only advocated 
the serious, systematic use of ges-
ture, but insisted that gestural com-
munication was more effective than 
spoken language. For their models, 
they turned to Eastern theatre 
forms. For Artaud, the European 
theatre which relied on the word to 
represent ideas was not as pure as 
the Balinese theatre which em-
ployed gesture and sign. Brecht, an 
admirer of the Chinese actor and 
mime Mei Lan Fang, felt that all 
true theatrical communication was 
gestural, showing meaning instead 
of telling it. 
The juxtaposition of 
serene cerebration and 
active intellection was 
a perfect combination 
for Gertrude Stein. 
Brecht made brilliant use of 
words, but only as a part of the 
larger gestus. He and Artaud un-
derstood that the totality of theatri-
cal communication, the macro-ges-
ture if you will, is composed of 
every sensuous element on the 
stage-<:ostumes, lighting, proper-
ties, scenery, make-up, movement, 
gesture, and the spoken word. 
Semioticians would say simply 
"all that is on stage is a sign." In 
fact, a semiotic theory of theatre 
identifies many distinct sign sys-
tems in use during a single theatre 
event, and posits a complex interac-
tion among those systems. The 
thought of managing the informa-
tion being projected from the stage 
is daunting. That is, however, what 
a director is expected to do. 
(6) There are some theatre direc-
tors who are better able to control 
the signal information on the stage 
than others. (I think, for example, 
of the late Alan Schneider directing 
a late work of Samuel Beckett to 
perfection.) But to insure that the 
entire communicative transaction 
between all the signs transmitting 
information from the stage and the 
spectators, each of whom is inter-
preting those signs according to a 
personal set of codes, is certainly 
not possible. 
At best, the director must make a 
series of educated guesses about 
the audience's interpretive codes. 
He assumes the audience's familiar-
ity with such signal systems as lan-
guage and gesture as well as scen-
ery, stage lighting, costume, and 
make-up. The director can be less 
sure of the spectator's cultural 
codes, which are derived from his 
entire life experience. It is on the 
basis of these codes that an indi-
vidual interprets the signs transmit-
ted in the course of any event, 
theatrical or other. 
If the communication is to have 
any chance of being successful, the 
audience members must not only 
be able to understand the various 
signs of theatre, they must also be 
able to recognize the performance 
as such. They must understand the 
rules of the theatre game, includ-
ing the rule of "framing." All in-
itiated audiences frame, by attend-
ing to certain signs that they un-
derstand to be part of the perform-
ance, and disattending to other 
signs that are not. Thus, an actor 
sneezing onstage will be within the 
frame, a sneezer in the audience 
will be outside. 
Most of us have viewed programs 
or performances "signed for the 
hearing-impaired ." If we are mem-
bers of the hearing audience, we 
are accustomed to placing the sign-
ers outside the frame. (Television, 
as always, rushes to the aid of the 
inept by drawing a graphic frame 
around the signer and placing him 
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in a corner of the screen.) 
But what about sign interpreters 
in a play like The Signal Season of 
Dummy Hoy? Inside or outside? 
Joyce L. Cole and Paul Raci sat 
roughly upstage center on the tiny 
Commons Theatre stage. They 
were costumed in vaguely late-
nineteenth-century style. They are 
experts who sign not only with 
hands and fingers but also face and 
body. It was possible for a hearing 
audience member to disattend to 
the signers, but were they meant to 
be outside the frame? 
The Commons Theatre sign in-
terpreters remained stationary, 
making framing possible. When 
The National Theatre for the Deaf 
brought its beautiful production of 
The Heart is a Lonely Hunter to the 
VU campus last February, they de-
liberately made such framing im-
possible. There were both deaf and 
hearing actors in the company, as 
well as ones who spoke and ones 
who did not. 
As the story of the deaf-mutes 
Singer and his beloved Antonapou-
los unfolded, the task of interpret-
ing was assumed by various actors 
on what appeared to be a random 
rotating basis. Sometimes actors 
spoke for themselves; at other 
times, their colleagues spoke for 
them, following no discernible pat-
tern. The result was not the chaos 
that one might fear, but a choir of 
actors in a polyphonic performance 
of shared communication. There 
was no need, and certainly no de-
sire, to disattend to anything. 
(7) Finally, in that moment when 
Dummy Hoy describes to the um-
pire a system of signs for balls and 
strikes, two cultures meet. Each has 
its own language and lore, its own 
way of expressing sorrow or telling 
a joke. Of course, there are large 
segments of the culture that over-
lap one another, but there is much 
that is distinct. 
Each conversant is proud of his 
language. Each is painfully aware 
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cultures is the sign. of his limitations as a com-
municator. Each culture has much 
to give to the other, and much to 
tolerate about the other. The line 
of confrontation extends from the 
lighted stage into the darkened au-
ditorium, where we sit next to them. 
The bridge between the two 
Alien and exclusivistic at first, ul-
timately the sign of a good show is 
unifying. It was always been so, for 
at the beginning of a play, there 
are always at least two distinct cul-
tures; at the end of a successful 
show, there is often only one. Cl 
After Watching the Space Shuttle Explode 
Bury the film, and let 
the simple air we breathe 
be marble. Over and over 
they reel it back as if 
asking how could we save them 
seventy seconds into launch . 
Surely a trick, a flash 
of powder, the shuttle 
suddenly gone, two solid 
wobbling rockets rising 
out of a cloud, like magic. 
We applauded, and aaahed, 
believing what happened 
was planned. We've all seen 
rockets part in a flash, 
the second they should 
then a spaceship emerge. 
Smoke streamed to the ocean 
and we moaned, over and over 
begging oh God, oh no. 
alive like us 
seconds ago, then a billow 
we cheered by mistake. 
We shudder, fully alive 
to imagine that vast 
explosion, that burning, 
that breaking apart of worlds. 
Walter McDonald 
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Poems as Objects 
Charles Vandersee 
Out of himself like a thread the child spins 
pain 
and makes a net to catch the unknown 
world. 
Words gather there heavy as [ISh, and 
tears, 
and tales of love and of the polar cold. 
Now, says the child, I shall never be 
young agazn. 
The shadow of my net has darkened the 
sea's gold. 
Dear Editor: 
The last time I wrote you about 
one of my favorite topics, poetry, 
was over a year ago. Complaining 
that the anthology I chose for a 
class the next semester had the 
usual faults of the genre. 
Well, the anthology worked all 
right. We did have to supplement it 
with more poems by Emily Dickin-
son, Wallace Stevens, and W. B. 
Yeats, and I made up handouts 
with prose passages from certain 
poets, on their theories and desires. 
The course itself last fall went very 
well. 
It helps that in Dogwood we 
have a "supportive atmosphere" for 
poetry. The Department of English 
brings in poets to read (during the 
present semester we have Jay Pa-
rini, Robert Morgan, Amy Clam-
pitt, and Louise Gluck), while 
Charles Vandersee has returned to 
Dogwood, Virginia, from Oregon and 
Washington. 
26 
downtown an art gallery presents 
Sunday night readings for poetry 
and fiction, mostly local writers, 
and on Wednesdays a bookstore 
does the same. 
Among the visiting poets last fall 
was one of our former graduate 
students in writing, Richard Kat-
rovas. He now has two books of 
poems from Wesleyan University 
Press, which publishes one of the 
most respected series in the coun-
try. Since our budget allows for 
Scotch and pretzels, I talked with 
him after the reading and learned 
he was staying an extra day in Dog-
wood. He should come to my class, 
I told him, without thinking. With-
out thinking, he agreed. 
We made no big plans and there-
fore earned ourselves the kind of 
success based on spontaneity. The 
lively, shaggy visitor, sitting at one 
end of the long table, opposite the 
teacher, restored to our minds a 
Keats letter considered a week ear-
lier. He recited some good things 
from memory, including the 
Gerard Manley Hopkins lament, 
"Margaret, are you grieving? I 
Over Goldengrove unleaving?" He 
spoke about his own discovery of 
poetry while a "hoodlum" in Tide-
water, Virginia, and he read with 
force and feeling some of his own 
poems, in both traditional forms 
and open form. 
Then, near the end of the semes-
ter, to the Sunday series downtown 
came the 1986 Pulitzer Prize poet, 
Henry Taylor. Henry was still an 
undergraduate when I arrived at 
the University a score of years ago, 
and he was accomplished already 
then. My ear, ever since, has re-
tained the music of his sestina on 
the "summer girls" that boys meet 
at camp; the poem is in his first 
book. 
He was not in town long enough 
to come to class, but I brought to 
class some of his poems. He too 
was a success, especially with a 
poem set at a large concrete park 
in northern Virginia familiar to 
several students. "Evening at Wolf 
Trap" expertly turns an ordinary 
object, a frisbee, into an arresting 
symbol-as Yeats did with a rag-
and-bone shop. The frisbee hovers 
for an instant before settling down, 
symbolizing, among friends, a mo-
ment of happiness in which "all 
things ceased to age." The rag-and-
bone shop is Yeats in old age fall-
ing back upon the human heart 
and its ordinary human desires as 
the source of poetry. 
So thinking back on the course, I 
realized I wanted to repeat it this 
fall. But Emily Dickinson was our 
only non-male voice, and I craved 
more variety. Students did not 
complain (Dogood students seldom 
complain), but I myself wanted to 
hear at least one more woman spin-
ning threads and making nets. 
Not Christina Rossetti, who wrote 
some of the most awful hymn lyrics 
of the Victorian century. Nor have 
I acquired a taste for the bland un-
derstated poems of Elizabeth 
Bishop. I should get to know 
Muriel Rukeyser, since a former 
student of mine, Kate Daniels, her-
self a prize-winning poet, is a great 
enthusiast-in fact, writing a book 
about her. I admire a lot of things 
by Sylvia Plath and Anne Sexton. 
Emily Dickinson was the 
only non-male voice 
in the course, and I 
craved more variety. 
But these women are all Ameri-
can or British. Then I remembered 
Judith Wright, who will give us a 
place and sensibility perhaps differ-
ent from England and North 
America. 
These hills my father's father stripped, 
and beggars to the winter wind 
they crouch like shoulders naked and 
whipped-
humble, abandoned, out of mind. 
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Of their scant creeks I drank once 
and ate sour cherries from old trees 
found in their gullies fruiting by chance. 
Neither fruit nor water gave my mind ease. 
I dream of hills bandaged in snow, 
their eyelids clenched to keep out fear. 
When the last leaf and bird go 
let my thoughts stand like trees here. 
I first saw Judith Wright on a 
shelf of unwanted books in the of-
fice of the Virginia Quarterly Review 
in Dogwood: books not assigned 
for review, not picked up for a 
short notice, and not taken by the 
university library (which had prob-
ably purchased a copy). I looked in-
side The Double Tree: Selected Poems 
1942-1976 (Houghton Mifflin), saw 
at a glance that she was good, paid 
my fifty cents and brought her 
home. This was in 1979; VQR re-
mainders are now one dollar. 
The poem as object is a 
poem of the admirable 
dishonesty we call art. 
What distinguishes it, 
often, from the poem of 
process is that it permits 
repeated reappraisal. 
I read her through, made some 
marks, went around talking about 
her, and then went on to other 
things. When I pulled her out a few 
months ago I saw stanzas like this: 
Nothing is so bare as truth-
that lean geometry of thought; 
but round its poles there congregate 
all foliage, flowers and fruits of earth. 
She was fully as good as I had 
thought, and this fall she will have 
twenty new admirers. 
Judith Wright's ancestors settled 
in New South Wales, in southeast 
Australia, in 1828. She was raised 
on that land, distant from any 
town, and, except for a year's travel 
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in Europe after college, she has 
lived and worked-writing, manag-
ing property, conserving wildlife-
there and in Sydney and near Bris-
bane. She helped run a literary 
magazine at the university in Bris-
bane, and one sees that she has 
read Yeats: 
Once as I travelled through a quiet 
evening, 
I saw a pool, jet-black and mirror-still. 
Beyond, the slender paperbarks stood 
crowding; 
each on its own white image looked its fill, 
and nothing moved but thirty egrets 
wading-
thirty egrets in a quiet evening. 
What 1 particularly like about 
Wright-and Yeats, and Stevens 
and Dickinson and Plath and Keats 
and Henry Taylor and Richard 
Katrovas-is that her poems are ob-
jects. They are formed, polished, 
definite objects. 
Does it seem odd to emphasize 
the word? One of the present con-
troversies of poetry is that of object 
versus process. Regnant at this mo-
ment is process-the poem modest, 
prosy, often inconclusive, purport-
ing to be the unreflecting and 
spontaneous response to a small 
personal situation. Its merit is its 
honesty, its truth-it is experience 
rendered directly (that is, the very 
process of that experience), in first 
person and present tense. Rather 
than the process reflected upon 
and perhaps combined with knowl-
edge of history, of other people's 
experiences, and other issues en-
tirely. As much as anyone else, 
William Carlos Williams is its 
father, and his children are many. 
By contrast, the poem as object is 
a poem of the admirable dishonesty 
which we call art. What distin-
guishes it, often, from the poem of 
process is that it permits repeated 
reappraisal. True, the poem of 
process often carries an urgency of 
emotion that permits rehearing and 
effective re-experiencing; the ar-
chetype is (curiously) by another 
Wright, the James Wright of Mar-
tins Ferry on the Ohio River. His 
poem "A Blessing" will always be 
read with enjoyment owing to the 
pain of lost innocence which it 
evokes, in the encounter with two 
lovely, shy Indian ponies, and espe-
cially owing to its startling last 
lines: 
Suddenly I realize 
That if I stepped out of my body I would 
break 
Into blossom. 
But the poem does not permit 
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much reappraisal, in the sense of a 
re-experience enlarging the reader. 
In selecting poems for teaching, 
and for my own experience with 
language, I choose mainly "the 
poem as object." I seldom teach 
James Wright or William Carlos 
Williams, though I recommend 
such poets to students who wish to 
see what in our moment is most ad-
mired. 
What is admired at the mo-
ment-the moment stretching from 
Joseph McCarthy on down through 
Vietnam and Watergate to Iranian 
arms deals-is truth. Truth being 
scarce in politics, people try to 
place it in poems. 
But truth, as Judith Wright says, 
is "bare." It is a curious thing; in 
architecture and design I do crave 
the "bare"-give me Mies van der 
Rohe, give me the simple lines and 
bright light woods of Scandinavian 
furniture. But in poems I need the 
complexity of earth-dirt and soil 
(rags and bones transfigured) and, 
rising out of it, Judith Wright's 
"foliage, flowers and fruits ." 
What is admired at the 
moment-the moment 
stretching from Joseph 
McCarthy on down to Iran 
arms deals-is truth. 
Craving of complexity is not an 
obsolete adherence to the New 
Criticism. At Valparaiso Univerity 
in the 1950s we did pay careful at-
tention to individual poems as ob-
jects, but we were not indoctrinated 
into irony, ambiguity, and Brooks-
and-Warren. I have not had New 
Critical shackles to break, as far as 
I can tell, so that I respect the care 
such critics brought to the poem-as-
object, rather than join in the pres-
ent-moment cry of disdain. The 
thing is, leaving cant aside, most 
poems are objects, though of course 
not only objects. 
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Request to a Year 
If the year is meditating a suitable gift, 
I should like it to be the attitude 
of my great-great-grandmother, 
legendary devotee of the arts, 
who, having had eight children 
and little opportunity for painting 
pictures, 
sat one day on a high rock 
beside a river in Switzerland 
and from a difficult distance viewed 
her second son, balanced on a small 
ice-floe, 
drift down the current towards a waterfall 
that struck rock-bottom eighty feet below, 
while her second daughter, impeded, 
no doubt, by the petticoats of the day, 
stretched out a last-hope alpenstock 
(which luckily later caught him on his 
way). 
Nothing, it was evident, could be done; 
and with the artist's isolating eye 
my great-great-grandmother hastily 
sketched the scene. 
The sketch survives to prove the story by. 
Year, if you have no Mother's day present 
planned; 
reach back and bring me the firmness of 
her hand. 
Liking that poem suggests why I 
don't actively dislike Elizabeth 
Bishop and James Wright, though 
I often find them bare. The narra-
tive is characteristic of Bishop (see 
her "Large Bad Picture"), but I 
think she would have stopped be-
fore the splendid closure, leaving 
emotion to be inferred. That 
strong conclusion does remind me 
of James Wright's poem mentioned 
above, except that the formality of 
the rhyme conveys a power that 
comes from the act of planning 
that rhyme, whereas a prose excla-
mation has only the power of spon-
taneity. To put it another way, 
James Wright remains at the fence, 
momentarily transfigured (the fris-
bee hovering), while Judith Wright 
would vault across, into a passion-
ate permanent transfigurement. 
She tells us what it feels like to 
think, not just what it feels like to 
feel. 
What I say here in confidence 
would of course be attacked by 
poets and critics of different com-
mitments and tastes from mine. 
And by readers with similar inclina-
tions but with different responses 
to the poems cited. Controversy 
and taste are like flowers and 
foliage-we cannot always know 
where the roots are. 
What I say here in 
confidence would of 
course be attacked by 
poets and critics of 
different commitments 
and tastes from mine. 
But I am not going to fight 
Judith Wright's battle, or place her 
in Anglo-American categories. I 
will merely present her to students 
as worth attention, as a person able 
to fi ll some of the space inside the 
mind, which is what I require of 
the other poets chosen. Too many 
of the poets of the present moment 
cannot or will not do that. 
And often too, in service to 
truth-the truth of a small personal 
moment-poets of the moment sac-
rifice one last matter, which one re-
ally hesitates to mention , since it is 
so long out of favor (though I 
notice it creeping back into critical 
discourse, as reviewers compliment 
such writers as James Merrill and 
yet another Wright, Charles 
Wright). I mean music. 
Bring me that harp, that singer. Let him 
smg. 
Let something fill the space inside the 
mind, 
that's a dry stream-bed for the flood of 
f ear. 
Song's only sound; but it 's a lovely sound, 
a fountain through the drought. Bring 
David here, 
said the old frightened king. 
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Walter Wangerin , Jr., first re-
ceived national recognition almost a 
decade ago with The Book of the Dun 
Cow (1978) , which The N ew York 
Times selected as Best Children's 
Book of the Year and which also 
won the American Book A ward for 
the Best Science Fiction Paperback 
in 1980. Wangerin has sub-
sequently published Ragman and 
Other Cries of Faith ( 1984) and The 
Book of Sorrows (1985), a formidable 
sequel to The Book of the Dun Cow. 
The Orphean Passages and a recently 
released collection of poetry, A 
Miniature Cathedral, are further 
signs of Wangerin's maturing pro-
ductivity. 
In Orphean Passages Wangerin at-
tempts to move beyond fable and 
religious story to a more compli-
cated weaving together of at least 
three main narrative strands-the 
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retelling of the Greek myth of Or-
pheus, the recent story of Pastor 
Orpheus and his representative 
"passion" in an inner-city church, 
and, more loosely, but integr;d to 
the drama of faith the author 
shapes, the narrator's glosses and 
commentary on the meaning and 
significance of his coinhering 
stories. 
Ideally, it seems to me, one 
ought to read Wangerin's main 
works in sequence, for what 
makes The Orphean Passages uncon-
ventional as literature is Wangerin's 
bringing together story and literary 
oratory. If we continue with the 
weaver image, we see how the myth 
of Orpheus provides a necessary 
framework for Pastor Orpheus' 
passages. This relationship is not 
one of mere prototype or antitype 
to type, nor a matter of Wangerin's 
introducing a form of "figural" in-
terpretation into his own work. 
Rather, each story corresponds and 
differs in its context and applica-
tion and in precisely those ways 
that require the weaver to do his 
work and to comment on it. 
The Orpheus myth provides a 
flexible but controlled schema for 
Pastor Orpheus' story. More accu-
rately perhaps, the myth of Or-
pheus provokes both dialogue and 
dialectic between classical myth and 
Christian story, a contest for our 
participating and understanding 
the nooks and crannies of every-
man and everywoman's faithful 
quest and journey. 
Wangerin legitimizes his strategy 
with an opening quotation from 
the second century saint, Justin 
Martyr: "Whatever things were 
rightly said by any man, belong to 
us Christians. For those writers 
were able to see reality darkly, 
through the seed of the Word 
planted within them." This happy 
inclusiveness gives The Orphean 
Passages a special kind of historical 
resonance and reflective depth. 
Wangerin offers his reader six 
distinguishable stages on faith's 
way: to experience the transporting 
love of God in ways similar to Or-
pheus' love and response to 
Eurydice; to feel great loss or the 
death of Christ as Orpheus lost 
Eurydice; to search with hope in 
the place of the lost and with the 
lost as Orpheus descended to search 
for Eurydice in the realm of the 
dead; to experience "faithing" as 
believing without seeing in the dark 
ascent as Orpheus, without looking 
back, sought to lead Eurydice out 
of the realm of the dead; to know 
the fear and terror of one's own 
nothingness and death in ways not 
completely different from Orpheus' 
having again lost Eurydice; to live 
by faith through the Resurrection 
in ways both like and joyfully dif-
ferent from Orpheus' final reunit-
ing with Eurydice in the realm of 
the dead. Wangerin ends his work 
with an epigraph from I John 1, 
annealing the completed joy ex-
pressed there with himself as scrip-
tor, or writer, and lector, or reader. 
Wangerin tries to hold 
together the furious rush 
of life in order to 
grasp some of its 
meaning and significance. 
A recitation of the schematic con-
nections does injustice to the more 
complicated and compelling ritual 
of participation both expected and 
required of the reader. For Wange-
rin attempts to hold together the 
furious rush and motion of life in 
order to grasp with words some of 
its meaning and significance. Be-
cause words slip, slide, congeal and 
fall apart, ambiguously reveal and 
conceal, Wangerin places before his 
ordinary reader a rather extended 
prologue on his and our human 
predicament when we write or read 
or think about the ineluctable re-
lationships between life or raw ex-
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perience and language. 
"Look," writes Wangerin about 
the verb "faithing," a verb more 
acutely describing lived Christianity 
than the noun "faith," "even I am 
pretending fixedness in this very 
act of writing a book for you, sup-
posing my words still to contain 
some meaning by the time you 
come to them to bleed them of that 
meaning. And I trust the pretense, 
that not all the blood's run out be-
fore you arrive." There is then a 
covenanted risk between writer and 
reader that beseeches participation, 
performance, appropriation on our 
part. 
What then commends this work 
to our energy and juices of feeling 
and mind? First of all, if one has 
read any of Wangerin's earlier 
works, one continues to hear the 
same richly modulated and 
eloquent speaking voice. Wangerin, 
for example, is perhaps more effec-
tive as story teller when he writes 
under classical constraint. He keeps 
his lyrical gifts and his intensity 
controlled so that we feel an almost 
elegant ease in his rehearsal of the 
deeply moving story of Orpheus 
and Eurydice. 
In addition there are, of course, 
repeated and sensitively altered 
motifs. In The Orphean Passages 
Wangerin renders more humanly 
explicit what he worked with indi-
rectly through fable in Chaunte-
cleer's quest with Pertelote and her 
community of hens and sundry 
barnyard folk-a quest for justice 
and peace and eventual forgiveness 
in The Book of the Dun Cow and The 
Book of Sorrows. 
R. P. Blackmur has pointed out 
that in contemporary American 
poetic religious sensibility there con-
tinues a double concern: a long 
and arduous pursuit for light at the 
end of the journey and a crushing 
certainty that the darkness through 
which the poet journeys is over-
whelmingly near. Pastor Orpheus' 
journey and Wangerin's commen-
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tary on these concerns offer the 
reader another telling of that 
spiritual quest in contemporary 
Christian terms. Because Orpheus 
and Pastor Orpheus and Wangerin 
sing their words to enchant ani-
mate and inanimate ears alike, one 
necessarily pauses before the more 
obvious pleasures that Wangerin 
brings to melodious language and 
sometimes to coarse and brutal 
words. 
There is a covenanted 
risk between writer and 
reader that beseeches 
participation, activity, 
appropriation on our part. 
Aside from the well-crafted tell-
ing of the Orphean passage, fur-
thermore, Pastor Orpheus' story 
and the embedded stories of the 
inner-city people who love, sustain, 
stun, and redeem him, make this 
work worth patient reading. I liked 
particularly Mrs. Allouise Story's 
story because of her relentlessly 
stubborn and graceful synergism. 
When Pastor Orpheus urges on the 
widowed and failing Mrs. Story 
that "God is a merciful God, after 
all," she offers her rejoinder as she 
struggles up the steps in the clean 
and orderly home that leads to the 
room she shared with her husband, 
"Well, let's say that he's keeping the 
bannister from breaking, but it's 
me that's doing the pulling." 
Because Wangerin writes of what 
he has suffered and learned, of his 
people and the cadences of lived 
speech, the words and images of 
those people-streetwise, vic-
timized, compassionate, and out-
raged-sometimes beat like ham-
merblows on our heads, their 
words and predicaments striking at 
the religious and moral and imagi-
native inertia in our human hearts. 
The fictions, the pretense, here 
take on more reality than the living 
celebrities that move daily and 
quickly to extinction across the col-
ored mist of the media screens in 
our living rooms and dens. 
If the reader, moreover, happens 
to be a Christian within a histori-
cal and liturgical tradition, and if 
he or she has known some of the 
genuine delight, mumacy, and 
laughter of having been reared in a 
good home, where parents could 
be kind and gentle and good-hu-
mored; and if families in these 
homes were bonded relatively close 
in congregational life, intermingling 
the taste of bread and wine in the 
sacrament with people rejoicing 
and sorrowing at once-well then 
Wangerin writes about these kinds 
of experiences and memories with 
genuine feeling. 
True, the story and its telling oc-
casionally appear as naive as Pastor 
Orpheus' initial piety, but because 
our teller and commentator 
watches himself telling that story, 
we can always take the proper step 
backward because Wangerin's com-
mentary is a kind of framing de-
vice, releasing us from too easy an 
identification with story and char-
acters. 
Our narrator, furthermore, 
preacher and orator that he may 
be, also knows the Singing School 
in the Western Tradition as well as 
some of the exhaustive normative 
and theological commentary on 
Scripture in that tradition. Because 
Wangerin steps forward to com-
ment on the narrative in order to 
explicate the drama of faith, one 
might be put off by the occasional 
allusive density informing the text. 
For example, unless one already 
knows George Herbert's poem 
"Easter Wings" and unless one is 
familiar with an archaic term from 
falconry like "imping," the grafting 
on of feathers to further flight, 
Wangerin's use of the allusion may 
strike the reader as deliberate 




allusion IS appropnate to Mrs. At-
louise's story and to the tradition. 
It quietly enriches the reader's 
grasp of the "perfect paradox" that 
Wangerin expands on in the fourth 
stage of faith's way, where the be-
liever is called upon to believe 
when believing seems pointless. 
Only there where "she can truly 
imp her wings on Jesus'. God is 
doing a new thing, however hurtful 
it may seem. She is moving toward 
the fall which finally shall further 
her flight." 
At other points Wangerin intro-
duces Scriptural distinctions and in-
sights that both attest to his own 
spiritual struggle and evolving wis-
dom and to the need for bringing 
these applications to readers less 
familiar with a tradition of a 
learned and eloquent ministry. 
Because Wangerin tries to do 
many things in this unconventional 
work our response will probably 
depend on our expectations and 
our own willingness to expand our 
reading "conventions" to include 
the kind of literary oratory Wan-
gerin delivers in The Orphean Pas-
sages. Apparently wishing to be 
both mother and midwife to his 
work, he does not cut the feeding 
tubes entirely from his work or sepa-
rate his artistic intention from direct 
statements to and for his audience. 
f My own response remains ambiv-
alent and provisional. I think I 
would more likely reread The Book 
of the Dun Cow or The Book of Sor-
rows. But The Orphean Passages 
necessarily brings theological clo-
sure to some of the unresolved 
problems raised in the earlier fa-
bles. 
I think that Wangerin tries in 
The Orphean Passages to bring his 
readers to the transforming power 
and joy of the Christian faith in a 
culturally pertinent way. The effi-
cacy of story rests in its oblique but 
immediate freeing effect. Story 
frees and perhaps flatters (as well 
as puzzles and confounds) the 
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reader's capacity to respond to 
story, to metaphor and symbol. 
This problem is not merely a 
matter of telling or showing. 
Rather it is a matter of the "purity" 
of telling in those written forms 
which come closer to persuasive 
speech or literary oratory. Story 
images and symbols generate their 
own "iconic augmentation," to use 
a bit of useful critical jargon from 
Paul Ricoeur. That is, there is a 
surplus of meaning available in 
written discourse, particularly in 
language prompted by those boun-
dary situations which lead to 
human reflection and which 
Wangerin writes of so effectively. 
Any schematization and the com-
mentary it produces are bound, 
consequently, to constrain the 
reader to attend primarily to the 
meaning and significance the au-
thor as narrator intends. The pro-
cedure is at worst "preachy," at best 
an enriching and complicated form 
of exhortation. Fortunately any au-
thor as narrator and commentator 
may find resistances generated by 
his or her own story and commen-
tary. 
In The Orphean Passages there 
surface these interference nodes 
that carry us from commentary to 
four years gone 
years fall. 
story and back again to reflective 
thought because Wangerin raises 
his own questions at a number of 
points. He struggles, for example, 
with St. John of the Cross! Wange-
rin's "gentle, loving quarrel" is with 
St. John and any spirituality which 
abstracts itself from "the stuff and 
tumble of physical human exis-
tence. [St. John of the Cross'] sense 
of experience is spiritual purely, as 
though it took place in a monk's 
cell only, apart from the mar-
ketplace." 
We gradually discern, of course, 
that what may be true of St. John 
of the Cross' spirituality may also 
be true of Pastor Orpheus. He 
needs to be "redeemed" by Chris-
tian friends who love him to the 
end in ways that he "knew" but did 
not understand until God in his 
love had worked his "faithing" 
through the passages to Pentecost. 
That Wangerin takes up this 
quest and his commentary in a cul-
ture and marketplace where both 
his kind of art and his theological 
concerns run across the grain is a 
tribute to the man, to his editors 
and publishers, and possibly to the 
"fit and few" Wangerin continues 
to address in his expanding and 
important work. •• •• 
our parting under pink blossoms, distant, 
terra-cotta figures glassed in, 
flesh outraged 
at the strength of seasons. 
we move on, flicker as history. 
where does God keep us? 
-our obscure length of finished days, 





As I write this, it is the Fourth of 
July, which explains the title. My 
memories of holidays are mostly 
great, but they blend together-it is 
the less ordinary ones that stick in 
the mind. 
My best Independence Day was 
on foreign soil. (Funny how ab-
sence makes the heart grow patrio-
tic.) After college I was on an over-
seas youth exchange, and on July 
4th, in Germany, a friend and I 
considered celebrating. We thought 
we should at least sing the Star 
Spangled Banner, but we needed a 
flag to do it right. 
I had some little kids' band-
aids-blue, with white stars-
brought for children I might meet; 
my friend had a red wallet. We cut 
some paper into strips, pasted them 
and a band-aid on the wallet, stuck 
a pencil through the contraption, 
and saluted our little Stars-&-
Stripes as we sang. It was probably 
the first time I ever paid attention 
to the words. 
My second most memorable 
Fourth was that Sunday in 1976, 
Bicentennial Day, when I lived in 
Canada. My family didn't own a 
color TV, so we rented one for 
July to watch the Bicentennial spe-
cials and the Montreal Olympics. 
I went to church in a red, white, 
and blue dress, then didn 't budge 
from the tube all day, watching the 
whole U.S. celebrate. I have seen 
spectacular fireworks , but the best 
ever were in Washington and ew 
York and Boston and St. Louis and 
everywhere else the TV took us 
that night. Sometime in the midst 
of it all I decided that someday, 
back home, I would like to run for 
public office-and now I am. 
There are dozens of good Christ-
mas times in my head, most con-
cerning family and friends. The 
crucial one, though, was at age 
twelve. I vividly recall observing my 
younger brother and sisters de-
lighting in their presents and think-
ing to myself: "I believe I am no 
longer a child." 
I definitely was not one the night 
I had too much New Year's Eve 
champagne, but I sure do re-
member that party! And I'm not 
talking. 
Easter is my favorite religious 
holiday, but two well-remembered 
ones were far from sacred. Once I 
worked in an inner-city congrega-
tion, living in the run-down house 
next to the run-down church in 
that run-down neighborhood. Hav-
ing stayed up very late the night 
before with friends and gotten up 
very early for sunrise services, by 
afternoon my husband and I needed 
a nap. It got dark while we slept; 
the place probably looked deserted. 
I woke to see the bedroom win-
dow opening and a stranger's head 
entering. The man beside me 
thought I was dreaming when I 
poked him, until he noticed the in-
truder. We both yelled, the man 
fled , and we called the cops. An of-
ficer came and listened to our 
story, shaking his head. 
"Look," he said, "we can't catch 
these guys if you scare them off 
like that. ext time let him get in-
side the house, okay? Then hit him 
over the head with a bat or some-
thing, and then call us. You can 
even kill him-just don't scare him 
away, or we can't help you." 
The other Easter wasn't so 
dramatic; I hesitate to bring it up, 
but it does linger in the mind. Sev-
eral years ago we were getting 
ready for my least favorite church 
service, a 5 a.m. Easter Vigil. Let 
me tell you, folks, you have not 
lived unless you have groped 
around at 4:15 in the wee hours, 
everyone in Easter finery, house 
guests and all, when the toilet de-
cides to overflow. Frankly, I 
haven't been back to a Vigil since. 
Then there was that one Feb. 
14th. I was gone all day, so it was 
late before I delivered a rather 
mushy Valentine to my "room-
mate." The late sports news was 
just over, and reading the card he 
smiled contentedly. "Isn't life won-
derful!" he exclaimed. "My wife 
loves me and Michigan beat Iowa." 
Ah well, at least he put me first . 
There's another event I associate 
with July 4th, even though it hap-
pened in June. We went to an old 
Canadian fort for a concert which 
was to end with the 1812 Overture, 
complete with muskets and can-
nons and all-typical Fourth fare. 
The kids wouldn't sit through con- • 
cert hall performances, but we 
hoped this would stuff some cul-
ture into them. They knew the 
Overture because Dad blasted it on 
the stereo whenever Mom was 
gone. 
The early part of the program 
dragged, and everyone became in-
creasingly aware of thunder. The 
orchestra upped tempo on the 
third last piece, the conductor an-
nounced they would skip the next 
one, and they swung into the 
1812-just as the sky opened. 
You should have been there: the • 
performers played faster as the 
rain fell harder, but the storm was 
winning. Soon half the orchestra 
stopped playing to hold umbrellas 
over the valiant few still tooting 
and sawing. Muskets sizzled, can-
nons roared, bells pealed-but at 
the final note, no cheering sounded 
and no bows were taken as the con-
ductor, musicians, soldiers, and au-
dience ran for cover in the wildest 
exit imaginable. 
Today that scene flashes before 
my eyes, and since there may never 
be another like it, I consider it to 
be an Honorable Mention holiday 
memory. It seems to fit right m 
with the others. C: 
The Cresset 
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